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STATE JURISDICTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FEDERAL
SUPREMACY
Ann Woolhandler* and Michael G. Collins**
Abstract
Federal Courts scholarship often focuses on access to federal courts
for the decision of federal claims. At the same time, many Federal Courts
scholars insist that state courts must hear federal causes of action, even
when the lower federal courts are open to the same claims—the very
federal courts regarded by such scholars as preferable to state courts.
This Article takes issue with suggestions that the state courts have
broad duties to entertain federal causes of action, whether statutory or
constitutional. There is little early support for requiring state courts to
entertain such claims and considerable evidence against it. In the
twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
began to compel state courts to take jurisdiction of certain federal
statutory actions—despite the absence of any explicit congressional
requirement for states to do so—in a line of cases associated with Testa
v. Katt. Neither the Supremacy Clause nor related arguments justify such
compulsion. The Court also occasionally required state courts to provide
certain constitutionally necessary remedies in a different line of cases
associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain. The constitutionallycompelled-remedies strand was based on a requirement that there be
adequate remedies for certain federal constitutional violations rather than
a Supremacy-based command that the states must provide the same
causes of action that the federal courts provided (as under Testa v. Katt).
More recent decisions such as Haywood v. Drown and scholarly
proposals following the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Montgomery
v. Louisiana threaten to submerge the Crain line of cases into the Testa
line, thereby possibly requiring greater state court conformity with
federal-court versions of causes of action raising constitutional claims.
Such uniformity, however, would diminish the role of the states in
fashioning different, yet constitutionally adequate, solutions to problems
of governmental illegality. State variation may be all the more important
in light of frequently voiced dissatisfaction with federal habeas corpus
doctrines and with constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Increased state court duties thus will not necessarily enhance the
enforcement of federal constitutional law, but might actually undermine
it.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal Courts scholarship often focuses on access to federal courts
for the decision of federal claims.1 Professor Paul Bator noted a
“rhetorical tradition” that asserted that “since the adoption of the Civil
War amendments and the post-War civil rights and jurisdictional statutes,
1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 697 (1989) (reviewing
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(3d ed. 1988)) (“[T]he structural superiority of federal courts in federal question cases is strongly
supported by the text, history, and structure of article III.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies
of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1158–64 (1988) (describing a nationalist paradigm
that sees federal courts as superior in the adjudication of federal rights).
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the task of formulating and enforcing federal constitutional principles
should in increasing measure be regarded as the task of the federal, rather
than the state, courts.”2 At the same time, many Federal Courts scholars
insist that state courts are obligated to hear affirmative federal causes of
action, even when the lower federal courts are open to the same claims—
the very federal courts regarded by such scholars as preferable to state
courts.3
The decisional law that may support such an obligation has two
different strands, one more directed to requiring state courts to entertain
federal statutory causes of action and another directed to requiring state
courts to supply certain constitutionally required remedies.4 The first
strand, associated with Testa v. Katt,5 ordinarily requires state courts to
hear federal causes of action created by congressional statutes.6 But the
Testa line of cases also allowed states to decline such jurisdiction
pursuant to state rules that were nondiscriminatory as between state and
federal claims.7 In Haywood v. Drown,8 however, the Court extended the
Testa line by holding that even a nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional
rule was not a valid excuse for denying jurisdiction over a federal
statutory claim if the state’s rule evinced hostility to the substantive
federal claim.9
The second strand of decisional law respecting state court
jurisdictional duties is associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain.10 In
Crain, the Supreme Court, on direct review of a state supreme court,
required the state court to entertain an ostensibly state law claim for an
injunction against a state official for his threatened enforcement of an
inspection fee alleged to violate the Constitution.11 In addition, the Court
has sometimes required state courts to entertain claims under state law in
which a plaintiff sought monetary relief for an allegedly illegal financial
2. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981); see also id. at 637 (“[S]tate courts will and should continue to
play a substantial role in elaboration of federal constitutional principles.”).
3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State
Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 73 (1998)
(assuming the superiority of federal courts but also favoring strong state court duties to entertain
federal statutory actions).
4. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 910–11, 935–36 (2017) (referring to the
two strands).
5. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
6. See id. at 394.
7. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009).
8. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
9. Id. at 739.
10. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
11. Id. at 214, 221, 231.
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exaction by the state.12 This second strand focuses more on assuring that
states supply constitutionally adequate remedies rather than demanding
that states provide the same causes of action that federal courts would
provide, as under the Testa line of cases.
It is possible, however, to see the Court’s decision in Haywood as
tending to make the constitutionally required remedies strand largely
superfluous. Haywood imposed an obligation on state courts to hear a
§ 1983 claim,13 which is a statutory action, but one that encompasses
most constitutional remedies against state and local officers—remedies
that are not all necessarily constitutionally required.14 Relying in part on
Haywood, together with the Court’s more recent decision in Montgomery
v. Louisiana,15 Professors Carlos Vázquez and Stephen Vladeck argue
that state courts may be obligated to entertain certain constitutional
attacks on state court criminal convictions through habeas corpus,16 even
when the state courts otherwise lack habeas jurisdiction and even when
the federal courts are open to hearing such claims.17 More generally,
Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that states would be obliged to hear
virtually all causes of action that federal courts hear:

12. See, e.g., Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 20 (1920).
13. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740.
14. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text.
15. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (holding that the state had incorrectly refused to apply
retroactively a Supreme Court decision forbidding mandatory life sentences without parole for
crimes committed by juveniles).
16. See generally Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4 (arguing that state courts are obligated
to provide collateral post-conviction review in the first instance). Particularly, they claim the duty
exists for Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), exception cases. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note
4, at 932. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 313 (plurality opinion) (indicating that new rules
of constitutional law could apply retroactively on habeas if the rule “places ‘certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe’” or recognizes new procedural rules “without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)));
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (reaching only Teague’s exception for new substantive rules).
17. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 932 (indicating that states would be obliged
to hear such habeas claims even when the state courts have no jurisdiction over any collateral
claims); id. at 933 (arguing that general jurisdiction over equity actions would be sufficiently
analogous to habeas); id. at 938–39 (indicating that federal courts may still hear Teague
exceptions claims although the Constitution would not require it); cf. Richard H. Seamon, The
Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2001) (concluding that
states are constitutionally required to provide certain remedies against themselves, particularly in
takings cases, even when federal courts are available, because of a procedural due process
obligation running to the sovereign that effected the deprivation); id. at 1110–15 (finding support
in the tax cases). But see Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033,
2036 (“[T]he Court has never squarely held that Congress can force a [state] court, which
otherwise lacks jurisdiction, to entertain a federal claim.”).
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If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.18
This Article takes issue with suggestions that the state courts have
broad jurisdictional duties to entertain affirmative federal claims, whether
statutory or constitutional. As a historical matter, the Framers did not
contemplate compulsory state court jurisdiction over affirmative federal
claims, and they rejected a proposal that would have provided for such
compulsion.19 Debates over the Judiciary Act of 178920 also support the
lack of such a duty.21 In addition, state courts declined early on to
entertain federal civil enforcement actions without apparent reaction.22
And the Supreme Court held that no federal question was raised for
purposes of its appellate review when state courts declined jurisdiction
over causes of action raising federal claims.23 With a limited exception
for Contract Clause cases where the nineteenth-century Court sometimes
required state courts to restore state-law remedies that were available at
the time of contracting, there were no cases forcing state courts to
entertain affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims.24
Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, the Court began to
impose duties on state courts to entertain affirmative claims under federal
statutes in the line of cases associated with Testa. The justification for
imposing such duties remains thin, given the availability of federal courts
to hear federal statutory claims and given the absence of any explicit
congressional requirements that state courts hear such claims.25 Starting
in the same period, the Court imposed on state courts some duties to
supply an adequate remedy for certain constitutional violations in the line
of cases associated with Crain.26 The Crain line differed from the Testa
18. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 935.
19. See infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
20. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
21. See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Adsit, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185, 188–90 (1873); see also infra notes
88–97 and accompanying text (discussing Smith and other cases regarding appellate review in this
context).
24. See infra notes 81–128 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 129–85 and accompanying text. This does not suggest that a clear
congressional command would suffice to compel state courts to accept unwanted jurisdiction. See
infra note 168.
26. See infra notes 186–91 and accompanying text.
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line in a number of ways. It generally was limited to cases in which the
Constitution required a remedy, the obligation could be administered in
a rule-like fashion—e.g., the repayment of illegally collected taxes—and
federal court jurisdiction was unavailable or disfavored.27 The obligation
was for state courts to supply a constitutionally adequate remedy of their
own making, not for states to entertain causes of action in the same form
as federal court causes of action.28
The Court’s decision in Haywood and recent scholarly proposals
could mean that states will have to supply remedies in constitutional cases
pursuant to the same causes of action that the federal courts supply. Such
uniformity, however, threatens to diminish the role of the states in
fashioning different solutions to problems of governmental illegality.
State variation may be all the more important in light of frequently voiced
dissatisfaction with federal court habeas and Section 1983 doctrine.29 In
addition, making state habeas conform to federal habeas could suggest
reduction of a duplicative federal court role. State court duties thus will
not necessarily enhance the enforcement of federal constitutional law and
might actually undermine it.30
This Article proceeds as follows. After briefly defining “affirmative
claims” under federal law, Part I shows that neither the Constitutional
Convention, debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor practices through
the nineteenth century support state court obligations to entertain
affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims. Part II discusses the
modern Court’s imposition of an affirmative duty on state courts to
entertain federal statutory claims and argues that this duty is not justified
by the Supremacy Clause or related arguments. Part III discusses the
limited tradition of the Supreme Court’s requiring state courts to supply
certain constitutionally required remedies. Part IV discusses how
scholarly proposals based on Haywood and Montgomery might change
this limited tradition and why the Court should not require state courts to
conform to federal causes of action for raising constitutional claims.
I. EARLY UNDERSTANDINGS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL DUTIES
This Part addresses the historical absence of any tradition of
compulsion for state courts to entertain affirmative federal claims,
whether under federal statutes or raising constitutional issues.31 By
27. See infra notes 192–234 and accompanying text. “Disfavored” refers to the Court’s or
Congress’s directing certain types of cases to state trial courts rather than to lower federal courts.
See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 186–234 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 283, 295 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Given the general lack of compulsion for either type of claim, this Part will not address
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“affirmative claims,” this Article refers to causes of action for damages
or injunctive relief to enforce a federal statutory or constitutional norm.
Affirmative claims may be distinguished from federal defenses—for
example, where a state brings a state law enforcement action in state court
and the defendant raises a federal defense, such as the inconsistency of
the state law with the Constitution or other federal law.32 Of course, state
courts must properly apply valid federal law when considering a properly
raised federal defense to a state law claim, and they must properly apply
federal law when hearing affirmative causes of action that they choose to
entertain.33 And such federal law will trump state law that is logically
inconsistent with federal law.34 This required application of federal law
in cases over which the state courts voluntarily exercise jurisdiction
results from the unexceptionable operation of the Supremacy Clause.35 In
addition, the Supreme Court may review the federal issue on direct
review,36 and such review of federal issues arising in cases that state
courts choose to entertain does not constitute compelling the state to hear
an affirmative claim in the first instance.37
A. Framing and Ratification
By most accounts, the framers of the Constitution chose neither to
mandate lower federal courts nor to fail to provide for them altogether.38
Instead, pursuant to the Madisonian Compromise reached at the early

statutory and constitutional remedies strands separately. In addition, until the modern era, the
Constitution itself would not have been seen as creating causes of action. Rather, constitutional
issues might have arisen as part of a common law case, although not necessarily as part of the
complaint. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 524 (1954) (discussing how, “[b]y almost imperceptible steps,” the
injunctive remedy against state officers came to be seen as conferred by federal law).
32. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89–95 (elaborating on a negative/affirmative
distinction as relevant to preemption versus commandeering).
33. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000).
34. See id. at 261–62 (indicating that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law would trump
logically contradictory state law).
35. See id. at 260.
36. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983).
37. Some affirmative claims could be characterized as defensive in some sense. For
example, a claim may seek relief for a prior extrajudicial tortious invasion of person or property
in violation of federal law, discussed infra notes 202–07 and accompanying text. Although one
might conceivably characterize such a claim as defensive, we nevertheless treat such actions as
affirmative.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
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stages of the Constitutional Convention,39 the framers expressly gave
Congress the power to create lower federal courts, with the only
constitutionally mandated federal court being the Supreme Court.
Some have argued that Article III’s provision leaving to Congress the
decision whether or not to create lower federal courts, when coupled with
the Supremacy Clause,40 means that state courts are under a
constitutionally grounded jurisdictional duty to entertain affirmative
claims under federal law, lest Article III cases and controversies have no
place to go if Congress failed to create lower federal courts. 41 At the
Convention, however, the topic of state court jurisdictional obligations to
entertain the cases and controversies encompassed by Article III went
largely undiscussed.42 To be sure, during the Convention, some suggested
that state officials, including state judges, would assist in the enforcement
of federal law.43 And when they did, they would be bound to conform
their behavior to the Constitution and valid federal laws.44 But there were
no clear suggestions that such judicial assistance would itself be
obligatory, as opposed to voluntary.45 Indeed, shortly after the
Madisonian Compromise, the framers rejected the New Jersey Plan that
seemingly would have compelled state courts to entertain federal actions,
and that would have given Congress no power to create lower federal
courts.46 But even if, under the Plan, state courts would have been obliged
39. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
7–9 (7th ed. 2015) (describing events at the Convention). But see Michael
G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 39, 59–60 (arguing that federal courts were seen by many as necessary, particularly given
possible limitations on states’ ability to take jurisdiction over certain kinds of federal claims);
Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA.
L. REV. 243, 254–55 (2011) (“The events surrounding the Compromise do not . . . lead ineluctably
to the conclusion that it was altogether optional for Congress to decide whether to create inferior
federal courts.”).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. See, e.g., Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1151, 1154 (1984) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause,
coupled with the fact that Congress was not required to create lower federal courts, supports strong
state duties to entertain federal causes of action, even beyond requirements of nondiscrimination).
42. Collins, supra note 39, at 135.
43. Id. at 136.
44. See id. at 111 (“[F]ederal interference would become primarily corrective rather than
preventive.”).
45. Id. at 136–44 (discussing contrary scholarship as well).
46. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his Haywood dissent, relied on historical scholarship that
the constitutional debates do not support federal compulsion of states to hear affirmative federal
causes of action. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 744–45, 751–52 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 256 (indicating that the mandatory
jurisdiction under the New Jersey Plan was tied to its not providing for lower federal courts); id.
at 258 (“[T]hroughout the process of ratification, there was little suggestion that the events of the
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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to exercise jurisdiction over federal judicial business in exchange for the
impossibility of lower federal courts, it is difficult to suppose that a
similar obligation silently survived the Constitution’s allowance for
lower federal courts, which the Plan had sought to prevent.47
During the ratification debates, in Federalist No. 82, Alexander
Hamilton wrote that state courts would be the “natural auxiliaries” in the
enforcement of federal law.48 Hamilton, however, was addressing
concerns that Article III might effect a substantial withdrawal of state
court jurisdiction.49 His response was that the states could generally
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the cases and controversies listed in
Article III, at least as to claims that would have been within the states’
“pre-existing” jurisdiction—power they would have held prior to the
Constitution.50 But Hamilton did not also suggest that they would be
compelled to hear affirmative claims under federal law, either as a matter
of the Constitution or congressional command.51 Perhaps AntiCompromise or the language of Article III implied anything about state-court powers (or duties)
to hear Article III business should Congress fail to create lower federal courts.”); Samuel P. Jordan
& Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47 GA. L. REV. 1161, 1215 (2013)
(“[T]he historical record does not support an anti-discrimination principle inherent in the
Supremacy Clause.”).
47. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 747–48, 748 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For the argument
that state courts would be obliged to hear federal judicial business even after the defeat of the New
Jersey Plan, based on the Confederation-era practice of Congress’s “appointing” state courts as
Article III courts, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2007–
32 (1993). The earlier practice of appointing state courts to hear certain federal admiralty matters
during the Confederation was likely because state courts—as state courts—were not thought
capable of exercising such jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 39, at 81, 119 & n.229. For the
argument that such appointment possibilities under Article III likely did not survive the
Constitution, see id. at 119–29. See also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual
Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 696, 770 (1998) (concluding that the final language of “ordain and establish” in Article
III foreclosed the possibility of “appoint[ment]” of state courts under Article III).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49. See Collins, supra note 39, at 46–48.
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 48, at 553–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
omitted); see also id. at 554 (“[T]his doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable
to those descriptions of causes of which the state courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally
evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to the constitution . . . .”
(emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 555 (“[S]tate courts will be divested of no part of their
primitive jurisdiction . . . .”).
51. Professor Wesley Campbell suggests that in Federalist No. 27, Hamilton supposed that
the Supremacy Clause, when combined with the Oath Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring
state officials to take an oath “to support” the Constitution), operated to command state judges to
hear federal claims. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122
YALE L.J. 1104, 1136–37 (2013). But nothing in Federalist No. 27 speaks of judicial obligations
to entertain jurisdiction (as opposed, presumably, to an obligation, like that upon all state actors,
to conform to supreme federal law when acting). See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 48, at
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Federalists hoped that state courts would step up to the plate and exercise
such jurisdiction, if only to prevent the need for lower federal courts or
to cabin their numbers and jurisdiction. Here, too, suggestions that the
federal government might “employ” or “make use of” the state courts
need not be read as suggesting that the Constitution or Congress could
coerce them into hearing federal judicial business against their wishes—
something that the Anti-Federalists likely would have found
problematic.52
Against this traditional account, Professor James Pfander has argued
that the Constitution provides for the coercion of state court jurisdiction
to the extent that “Article I . . . empowers Congress to constitute
tribunals . . . ‘inferior to the supreme Court.’”53 He argues that this
language allows Congress to appoint state courts to act as such tribunals
and that these tribunals, so constituted, would not be federal “courts”
within the meaning of Article III.54 Rather, they would be state courts
serving as Article I tribunals.55 There are, however, a number of
difficulties with the argument. First, it assumes that the inferior tribunals
provision in Article I is doing work above and beyond Article III’s
language of “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” inferior federal courts.56 As
Pfander himself notes, the “prevailing assumption” is exactly the
opposite: namely, that the language in Article I and Article III is
174–75 (Alexander Hamilton). For doubts about the relevance of the Oath Clause as it might
relate to the commandeering of state officials, see Prakash, supra note 47, at 2001 n.231. For a
statement that the Oath Clause did not make “the Judges of the several States the Judges of the
Union” and that it was “an Oath of Allegiance, and not an Oath of Office,” see William Paterson,
The Notes of William Paterson, in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1789-1791, at 474, 477 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit
eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC]. Cf. Campbell, supra, at 1151 n.198 (raising doubts as to
whether Paterson himself made such a statement or might have been quoting another Senator).
52. See Collins, supra note 39, at 135–44. For the view that the Anti-Federalists would have
welcomed the coercion of state officials in the enforcement of federal law, see Campbell, supra
note 51, at 1133–34. Professor Campbell argues that because of the difficulties regarding state
enforcement of a federal impost during the 1780s, the need for compulsory enlistment of state
officials to enforce federal law was something of an implicit background assumption. See id. at
1133 (“[I]t was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers would be compelled to
enforce federal law. . . . [C]ontemporaries would not have thought that Federalist silence signaled
a tacit denial of federal commandeering power.”).
53. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2007) [hereinafter, Pfander,
State Court Inferiority] (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9); see id. at 201–19; see also James
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States,
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 671–97 (2004) (developing a similar theory as to federal agency
adjudication).
54. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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synonymous.57 Second, although Pfander’s argument avoids the Article
II Appointments Clause58 and Article III Tenure Clause59 problems
associated with the possible ordaining of state courts as Article III
courts,60 there presumably would still be an Appointments problem if
state courts could be compelled to serve as Article I tribunals. Unless
Article I tribunals can be staffed by non-federal appointees, state judges
staffing Article I tribunals are arguably serving, pro tanto, as officers of
the Unites States.61 If so, Article II would have to be satisfied, which it
could not be if the appointment of state judges was not made by a proper
federal official but was made instead by statutory description, via
congressional action. The easier argument is the traditional one that state
courts hearing Article III cases and controversies do so as state judges,
not as Article III judges or Article I tribunal members.62
B. The Judiciary Act of 1789
This understanding of the limited force of the Constitution on state
court jurisdictional duties was borne out in the framing of the First
Judiciary Act63 in the debate over a motion in the House of

57. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201 n.42 (taking issue, however, with
what he acknowledges is the “prevailing assumption”). Pfander relies heavily on the suggestion
of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 81 that “[t]o confer the power of determining such causes
[i.e., those ‘arising out of the national constitution’] upon the existing courts of the several states,
would perhaps be as much ‘to constitute inferior tribunals,’ as to create new courts with the like
power.” Id. at 216 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton)).
But Hamilton was addressing the argument that the Constitution should have relied on “the
instrumentality of the state courts” more explicitly and more generally, and he may also have been
referring to the possibility of Congress’s enabling state courts to hear those matters outside of
their primitive or preexisting jurisdiction. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 546–47
(Alexander Hamilton); see supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60. Such a possibility was brought up, and effectively rejected, in debates over the first
Judiciary Act. See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1789–1791, at 1359 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
11 DHFFC] (statement of Rep. Madison, Debate of Aug. 29, 1789) (speaking of the “insuperable”
constitutional impediments to anointing state courts as Article III courts, and including an
argument under Article II’s Appointments Clause).
61. But see Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 222 (indicating that the judges
on state courts sitting as Article I tribunals would not be civil officers of the United States).
62. Pfander’s argument is not that the Constitution itself compels the state court
jurisdictional duties for which he argues. Rather, it is an argument respecting congressional
power. Pfander argues that the constituting of state courts as Article I tribunals can be triggered
implicitly by Congress’s stripping the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over certain federal
claims. See id. at 232.
63. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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Representatives to delete any reference to lower federal courts.64 Those
in favor of the motion supposed that state courts could hear in the first
instance all of the judicial business described in Article III, and thus there
was no need for lower federal courts.65 They did not therefore say that
state courts would be under a duty to entertain such claims; rather, they
stated that it was not “necessary” to create lower federal courts unless
state courts “will not execute” their own judicial power to hear Article III
cases.66 Those opposing the motion did so partly based on doubts as to
whether state courts would have the capacity to hear cases such as
prosecutions of federal crimes (as being outside their “pre-existing”
jurisdiction)67 and partly based on the fact that states might choose not to
hear such claims and “might refuse or neglect to attend to the national
business.”68
In short, there was disagreement not only over state court competence,
but over the likelihood that state courts would refuse to entertain the
judicial business mentioned in Article III. And with respect to the latter
point, the debate was not in terms of possible jurisdictional duties of state
courts, but in terms of the need for federal courts, depending on how
64. The motion (advanced by Rep. Samuel Livermore) appears to have been to eliminate
reference to the district courts, yet even those in favor of the motion seemed prepared to allow for
an admiralty court of some kind. See Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress,
and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1523–30 (2005).
65. See id. at 1532.
66. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1372 (statement of Rep. Stone, Debate of Aug. 29, 1789)
(emphasis omitted); accord id. at 1385 (noting Congress should not create federal courts until
their “necessity” becomes apparent).
67. For an account of the frequently repeated idea in the First Congress that some Article
III business might be off limits to the state courts, as state courts, including certain admiralty
matters and prosecutions for federal crimes, see Collins, supra note 64, at 1560 and Anthony J.
Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 975–77 (2006).
Although such an idea did not directly focus on the possibility of state court jurisdictional
obligations as opposed to notions of constitutionally driven federal court exclusivity, adherents to
such views also supposed that Congress could not constitutionally compel state courts to hear
such exclusively federal claims, even as “federal” courts. See, e.g., 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at
1359. Interestingly, James Madison—author of the Compromise—was among those in the House
who opposed the motion to eliminate the district courts, arguing that some federal claims would
be off limits to the state courts and thus, lower federal courts would be needed. See id. In short,
some of the logic attributed by modern scholars to the Compromise seems to have been lost on its
author.
68. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1369 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick, Debate of Aug. 29,
1789) (noting that state courts “might refuse or neglect to attend to the national business”); see id.
at 1386 (remarks of Rep. Gerry) (making a similar point, noting that state laws might prohibit
state courts from hearing non-state law matters); see also William Maclay, The Diary of William
Maclay, in 9 DHFFC, supra note 51, at 87 (recounting debate in the Senate and noting his own
(Sen. Maclay’s) observation that if cases arising under federal laws were brought in state court,
“a plea to the Jurisdiction would immediately be put in” and the proceedings halted).
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willing the state courts might be to hear matters under Article III. The
prevailing understanding on both sides of the debate therefore seemed to
be that a jurisdictional duty could not be imposed on the state courts.
Representative Fisher Ames, moreover, specifically rejected an argument
based on the Supremacy Clause to the effect that state courts would be
obligated to hear certain Article III business.69 He stated that “[t]he law
of the United States is a rule to them, but not an authority for them.”70
Ames also perceived that it might not be within the power of Congress to
compel the services of state officials, including judges.71
C. Early Statutory Actions
Scholars who argue for strong state court duties to entertain federal
claims sometimes cite early statutes in which Congress provided that state
courts could hear certain claims for fines and penalties for violations of
various federal postal, customs, and trade laws.72 But those provisions—
most of which involved civil actions brought by the United States—did
not purport to compel state courts to hear such claims so much as indicate
that state courts were not forbidden from hearing them. The reason for
69. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1358.
70. Id. Ames was referring to actions that he supposed the state courts could not
constitutionally hear.
71. Id. at 1358. Professor Campbell reads the debates over the 1789 Act differently. Cf.
Campbell, supra note 51, at 1146–53. He acknowledges that James Madison and others in the
House had constitutional doubts about handing over certain aspects of federal jurisdiction to the
state courts, and he agrees that Ames’s remarks were reflective of an anti-commandeering
sentiment (but marginalizes them as novel). See id. at 1148. Campbell focuses instead on the
statements of those supporting the motion who “rebuffed these constitutional arguments,”
including statements by Representatives Stone and Livermore. Id. at 1149. But statements to the
effect that state courts were “bound to take cognizance of the laws of the United States” (Rep.
Stone), or “must decide according to the supreme law” (Rep. Stone) need not be read as saying
anything more than that the Supremacy Clause would provide a rule of decision binding on the
state courts, as opposed to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation in the first instance. The statement
of Representative Livermore (who authored the motion), to the effect that state courts are “bound
to carry our laws into execution,” may come closer to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation, but
that too is not a necessary reading. See Collins, supra note 64, at 1575 n.232 (quoting 11 DHFFC,
supra note 60, at 1389 (statement of Rep. Livermore, Debate of Aug. 31, 1789)). And in any
event, these were the minority sentiments of those who were overwhelmingly defeated in their
motion to get rid of the district courts.
72. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L.
REV. 545, 551–54, 570–73 (1925) (arguing that Congress let states hear various penalty actions
and even prosecutions of federal criminal cases); see also Collins, supra note 39, at 87 (indicating
that the first Congress provided that state courts might hear certain claims as to fines, penalties,
forfeitures in connection with laws governing the mail, internal revenue, customs, embargoes, and
trade with Native Americans); Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 267–68 (indicating the claims
were primarily civil in form); id. at 270 (noting only one clearly criminal statute in Warren’s
catalog).
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such provisions was likely because the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over not just
“crimes,” but “offences” cognizable by the United States.73 The latter
reference might have been thought to extend to civil proceedings for fines
and penalties, so Congress was effectively letting state courts know that
they could hear such claims (if state law gave them jurisdiction) by
providing an express exception to the express provision in the 1789 Act
for federal exclusivity respecting offenses.74 Not even Professor Charles
Warren, who long ago explored those federal statutes, thought that they
mandated state courts to hear such claims, as opposed to giving them the
opportunity to do so if they wished.75 As the Supreme Court once
summed up the practice in connection with such penal actions:
[I]n these cases the co-operation of the States was a matter of
comity . . . . It was not regarded by either party as an obligation
imposed by the Constitution. And the acts of Congress conferring
the jurisdiction merely give the power to the State tribunals, but do
not purport to regard it as a duty, and they leave it to the States to
exercise it or not, as might best comport with their own sense of
justice, and their own interest and convenience.76
Thus, practice in the early Republic in connection with these claims
reinforces the notion that states might voluntarily undertake to entertain
certain affirmative claims under federal law, but they were not required
to do so.
Also, beginning in the early nineteenth century, many state courts
refused to entertain federal penal actions as beyond their jurisdiction and
as involving an impermissible exercise of the federal judicial power.77
For example, the Virginia General Court held that although Congress had
authorized state courts to hear certain cases involving federal revenue
violations, Congress lacked the power to do so, and the Virginia courts

73. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
74. See Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 266–70.
75. See Warren, supra note 72, at 546 (“While Congress has no power to force jurisdiction
upon a State Court, it has the power to leave jurisdiction to a State Court.”).
76. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109–10 (1861) (holding that states
could not be judicially compelled to comply with the Extradition Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 2), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
77. Collins, supra note 39, at 77–78, 77 n.93, 78 n.94; see also id. at 93, 98 (indicating that
states continued to decline to entertain such actions during the nineteenth century). Perhaps there
was a period of time in the late 1700s and very early 1800s when state courts were inclined to
hear such actions. See Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 109.
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could not hear such cases.78 And the New York Supreme Court of
Judicature similarly held that state tribunals could not take jurisdiction
over a civil suit by the United States seeking a penalty for a violation of
a federal licensing statute.79 There was nothing aberrational in these
refusals to entertain jurisdiction, and the states’ lack of obligation to hear
affirmative federal claims was consistently and unanimously reaffirmed
in the antebellum treatise tradition.80
D. The Supremacy Clause in the State Courts
The supremacy of federal law in the state courts was assured primarily
by Supreme Court direct review, under the 25th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, in causes of action that the state courts chose to entertain
and decided on the merits. For example, the early Supreme Court had
occasion to affirm81 or reverse judgments in trespass actions brought
against federal officers in state court.82 Accordingly, in Gelston v. Hoyt,83
the Court affirmed a damages judgment against a federal customs
collector and a customs surveyor for their wrongful seizure of a ship and
cargo.84 But such common-law claims were causes of action already
recognized under state law. And it generally was the officer-defendants
who sought review in such cases, invoking § 25’s provision for an appeal
“where is drawn in question the validity of . . . an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity.”85
Section 25 also provided mandatory review where a litigant could show
that he had been denied a federal “title, right, privilege or exemption.”86
Disappointed plaintiffs thus might seek review of actions claiming that a
78. Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 36 (1815); see also Collins & Nash, supra note
39, at 270 (discussing Rose and additional cases in which the state courts declined jurisdiction).
79. United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4, 4, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
80. See Collins, supra note 39, at 74–78 (noting views of James Kent, Joseph Story, St.
George Tucker, and William Rawle).
81. See, e.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 347 (1866) (affirming judgment in
trespass against the federal marshal who was plaintiff in error); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 1, 12 (1817) (affirming, on direct review, the state court’s judgment in replevin against a
federal surveyor of customs).
82. See, e.g., Harris v. Dennie, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 292, 305 (1830) (reviewing at the instance
of a federal marshal whom the sheriff had sued in trover for taking goods from the sheriff’s
custody to satisfy a federal bond) (reversing the judgment of the state court against the federal
officer).
83. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
84. Id. at 251–52, 269, 274, 278, 333, 336 (affirming a state court judgment in trespass
against the collector and surveyor).
85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see Buck, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 340
(stating that appellate jurisdiction was proper under this provision); Gelston, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
at 308 (citing, inter alia, this same provision).
86. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86.
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state court had improperly denied them a federal right in a cause of action
that the state court had decided on the merits.87
But when the state court denied the plaintiff relief on the ground that
there was no cause of action or no jurisdiction in the state courts, the
Supreme Court was reluctant to find that it had appellate jurisdiction. For
example, in Smith v. Adsit,88 a former soldier brought a state court action
for return of land or for compensation, based on a congressional statute
providing that any assignment of a soldier’s land warrant prior to its
issuance was void.89 The soldier claimed that, as a minor, he was misled
by his attorney into making such an assignment, and the state trial court
awarded the soldier damages of $6,829.90 The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, reversed without elaboration, based on lack of jurisdiction.91
The plaintiff then sought direct review, claiming that he had been denied
a federal title, right, privilege, or immunity.92 The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal, stating that “whatever may have been the reasons
for the decision, whether the court had jurisdiction of the case or not, is a
question exclusively for the judgment of the State court.”93 Similarly, in
Semple v. Hagar94 the plaintiff sued the defendant in state court to remove
a cloud on his title where two federal land patents apparently
overlapped.95 The California state courts refused to consider the
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant had obtained his patent fraudulently.96
When the plaintiff sought review, however, the Supreme Court stated that
while there would have been a reviewable issue if the state court had
taken jurisdiction and declared the defendant’s patent void under federal
87. See, e.g., Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682 (1883) (entertaining review at
the instance of the equity plaintiff who sought an injunction against the state’s building a bridge
as a violation of the Commerce Clause) (denying relief on the merits of the Commerce Clause
issue); Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1886) (entertaining
review at the instance of the steamship company that sought to enjoin a quarantine as violating
the Commerce Clause) (upholding the quarantine law on the merits).
88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185 (1873).
89. Id. at 186. Under various federal statutes, soldiers received a document or warrant
entitling them to claim a certain amount of land owned by the federal government, as a bounty for
their service. Id.
90. Id. at 186–87.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 190; see also id. at 189 (“The judgment of the court respecting the extent of its
equitable jurisdiction is, of course, not reviewable here.”).
94. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 431 (1866).
95. See Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163, 166 (1865), appeal dismissed, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 431
(1866). The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had obtained their patent fraudulently. Id. The
California court held that it would not allow a collateral attack on a federal board’s or federal
court’s determination that the patent should issue. Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 166.
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law, “it is hard to perceive how the twenty-fifth section could apply to a
judgment of a State court, which did NOT decide the question, and refused
to take jurisdiction of the case. The matter is too plain for argument.”97
E. Federal Remedies in Federal Courts
Rather than forcing state courts to supply affirmative remedies for
violations of federal law, the federal courts often found ways to entertain
such claims themselves. Thus, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,98
Chief Justice John Marshall gave an expansive reading to the scope of
judicial power authorized under Article III’s provision for federal
question jurisdiction. He noted that Congress could not be forced to rely
on state courts, “tribunals over which the government of the Union has
no adequate control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under
a law of the United States.”99 Similarly, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,100
Justice Joseph Story indicated that state courts would be inadequate to
enforce the federal Fugitive Slave Act,101 “since every state is perfectly
competent, and has the exclusive right . . . to deny jurisdiction over cases,
which its own policy and its own institutions either prohibit or
discountenance.”102 Justice Story, moreover, did not insist on state
compliance with federal law that had contemplated assistance from state
officials, but rather held that the federal government, federal officers, and
federal courts should be the primary and perhaps exclusive enforcers of
the Act.103
The federal courts did not supply affirmative remedies that might be
lacking in state courts by the use of federal question jurisdiction provided
under particular statutes—as was true with respect to the Second Bank of
the United States and the Fugitive Slave Laws. The Supreme Court was
also indulgent to litigants who sought to manufacture diversity as a way
to bring causes of action in law and equity raising constitutional questions
against state and local officials that the state courts would not have
97. Semple, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 434–35.
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
99. Id. at 821; see also Bellia, supra note 67, 969–70 (providing support for the view that
state courts did not have an obligation to enforce actions under federal law).
100. 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842).
101. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
102. Prigg, 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 614.
103. Id. at 615–16; see also id. at 617–18 (relying on the Fugitive Slave Act itself as
occupying the field to the exclusion of state power); id. at 622 (noting difference of opinion as to
the constitutionality of the provision of the Fugitive Slave Act that conferred authority on state
magistrates, but agreement that state magistrates could—if they chose to and were not prohibited
by state law—assist in enforcing the federal statute); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 125 (2d ed. 2006) (indicating that Justice Story may have lacked
a majority on his constitutional exclusivity argument).
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entertained. For example, in Dodge v. Woolsey,104 the Court allowed a
suit brought by an out-of-state shareholder of an Ohio corporation
challenging an Ohio tax on the corporation that he alleged violated the
Contract Clause.105 Even though a corporation’s shareholders at the time
were deemed citizens of the corporation’s state of incorporation, the
plaintiff was treated as diverse from the Ohio tax collector.106 There was
no pretense that the state courts would have entertained a similar equity
action or could have been compelled to do so.107 Similarly, the Court in
a related federal court action at law ignored state statutory requirements
that would have made an action for replevin unavailable against the tax
collector in state court.108
F. State Court Remedial Obligations and the Contract Clause
The closest the nineteenth-century Court ever came to forcing
jurisdiction involved cases under the Contract Clause, which ordinarily
prohibited states from retroactively invalidating contracts that were valid
when entered into, including contracts entered into by the State itself. In
a number of cases, when the Court found that state legislation violated
the Clause, the Court required state courts to provide remedies that had
existed at the time of contracting. Most cases of direct review in which
the Court decided a Contract Clause claim involved merely deciding a
federal question within an existing nonfederal cause of action. In Furman
v. Nichol,109 for example, Tennessee legislation had made notes issued by
the state-run Bank of Tennessee receivable in payment of state taxes by
the tax collector.110 The Tennessee legislature subsequently repealed the
statute that had provided for the collector’s duty under state law to accept
the bills, but left the state’s mandamus remedy intact.111 On direct review
from a mandamus action in which the state court denied relief, the
Supreme Court reversed and ordered the mandamus relief against the

104. 59 U.S. (13 How.) 331 (1855).
105. Id. at 336, 339.
106. Id. at 340–41, 345–46.
107. Cf. id. at 332–33 (argument of counsel) (arguing for the appellant that the collection of
the state revenue should not be arrested by injunction and also that “[a] stockholder ha[s] no right
to intervene for the protection of the bank”).
108. See generally Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 622 (1853) (setting forth the state
statute requirement in Justice Catron’s dissent, but ignoring the state statute in the majority
opinion, instead focusing on assignee clause issues), discussed in Ann Woolhandler, The Common
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 108–09 (1997).
109. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1869).
110. Id. at 45.
111. See id. at 62 (“It is conceded that these plaintiffs [were] entitled to the relief they ask, if
the defendant was obliged to receive the notes which were tendered.”).
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collector, because the repeal of the collector’s duty violated the Contract
Clause.112
States later tried to get around such results by not merely repealing a
duty on the officer but also abrogating the preexisting cause of action to
enforce such duties. For example, in Louisiana v. Pilsbury,113 state
legislation not only repealed the officials’ duties to pay off certain city
bonds but also repealed the state law mandamus remedy with respect to
enforcing that remedy.114 The Supreme Court held that the attempt to
repeal the remedies for the city’s default on the bonds—without an
adequate substitute—was itself a violation of the Contract Clause.115
“Legislation of a State thus impairing the obligation of contracts made
under its authority is null and void, and the courts in enforcing the
contracts will pursue the same course and apply the same remedies as
though such invalid legislation had never existed.”116 Similarly, in
Poindexter v. Greenhow117 and Chaffin v. Taylor118—two of a group of
cases challenging Virginia’s Reconstruction-era bond default119—the
Court ordered that damages must be awarded against a state tax collector
who had seized taxpayer property after the taxpayers’ tender of state bond
coupons that the state had previously promised to receive in payment of
state taxes.120 The state had purported to repeal the duty to accept the
coupons as well as the damages remedy against the collector. 121 The
Supreme Court, however, treated the repeal statutes as nullities because
they violated the Contract Clause122:
It is not denied that, but for these acts, the action of trespass
would lie in such a case under the laws of Virginia; and as the acts
relied on by the defendant must be treated as ineffectual for every
112. Id. at 62–64, discussed in Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 117; see also id. at 117
nn.203–04, 119 n.214 (citing additional cases).
113. 105 U.S. 278 (1882).
114. Id. at 299, 301. The action was brought by an in-state bank, id. at 278–79, and would
compel collection of a special tax of $650,000. Id. at 302.
115. Id. at 301 (“When the contract was made, the writ was the usual and the only effective
means to compel the city authorities to do their duty in the premises . . . . The only ground on
which a change of remedy existing when a contract was made is permissible without impairment
of the contract is, that a new and adequate and efficacious remedy be substituted for that which is
superseded.”). The Court in some cases, however, allowed some fairly questionable substitutions.
See Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 118–19.
116. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. at 302.
117. 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
118. 114 U.S. 309 (1885).
119. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
120. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310; Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 302.
121. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 274–75.
122. See id. at 282–83, 302, 306.
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purpose, they do not work a repeal of the previously existing
law.123
In these cases the Court did not impose a new jurisdictional or remedial
duty on the state courts, but effectively reinstated a duty that continued
to exist because the repeal itself was void as a violation of the Contract
Clause.
As was true in other cases involving constitutional issues, the lower
federal courts could also supply remedies in Contract Clause cases when
they could find a ground for federal jurisdiction. For example, in White
v. Greenhow,124 under the recently enacted general federal question
jurisdiction, the Court allowed a lower federal court claim for alleged
damages of $6,000 resulting from a seizure of property for taxes after the
plaintiff tendered Virginia coupons.125 Another case seeking an
injunction secured a federal forum by diversity of citizenship.126 The
requirement of over $500 in controversy both in federal question and
diversity cases, however, would have prevented the state court plaintiffs
in Poindexter and Chaffin from obtaining an original federal forum, and
the Court in those cases restored state damages remedies on direct
review.127 No amount in controversy was required for claims under the
predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court held that Contract Clause
claims did not involve rights directly “secured” by the Constitution within
the meaning of the “rights . . . secured” language of the 1871 Act.128
Rather, absent diversity of citizenship, such claims could proceed in
federal court only under the aegis of the general federal question statute,
as in White v. Greenhow.
In summary, the evidence from the era of framing and ratification
provides little support for an obligation on the part of state courts to hear
unwanted federal judicial business; indeed, precisely the opposite seems
more likely. And subsequent evidence from the First Judiciary Act, state
practice, the treatise tradition, and nineteenth-century caselaw all
strongly suggest that the prevailing understanding was that state courts
could not be compelled to hear affirmative federal claims. Contract
Clause cases provide an example of the Court, on direct review, forcing
123. Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310.
124. 114 U.S. 307 (1885).
125. See id. at 308.
126. See Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311, 316–17 (1885) (approving injunction
against collection officials after tender of coupons).
127. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 309 (seeking $150 in damages for seizure of a horse alleged to
be worth $100); Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 273 (seeking recovery of an office desk of $30 in value).
128. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 320, 322–23 (1885) (affirming
dismissal given that the 1871 Act was not available, nor was general federal question, because the
amount in controversy was not over $500); accord Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323, 324
(1885) (affirming dismissal for the same reasons).
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states to entertain causes of action. In such cases, however, the Court
simply restored preexisting state remedies that the Court treated as part
of the contract and whose repeal was a Contract Clause violation.
II. CONGRESSIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION
The discussion thus far has not separated federal statutory claims from
federal constitutional claims because in neither area—with the limited
exception of the Contract Clause cases—did the Court require the state
courts to entertain affirmative causes of action. During the twentieth
century, separate strands for statutory claims and for certain
constitutionally required remedies emerged. This Article therefore treats
them separately in the sections that follow.
A. Development of the Testa Strand
At the turn of the century, there had been no Supreme Court case
holding that state courts had to entertain a federal statutory claim.129
Congress overall seemed disinclined to look to the state courts for the
enforcement of federal statutory actions after its initial attempts in civil
penalty cases in the early Republic.130
129. To be sure, in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), the Court upheld the state
courts’ presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising out of a federal statute, largely
based on Federalist No. 82. Id. at 138–43. And although Claflin itself did not involve a suit for a
penalty under federal law, the Court stated that there was “no reason why” a state court “should
not” enforce a civil penalty under federal law. Id. at 137. The Court in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386
(1947), would later read this language as effectively answering the question of state courts’ duties,
not just power. Id. at 391 (“The Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments theretofore
advanced against the power and duty of state courts to enforce federal penal laws.”). But Claflin
was simply weighing in on the early nineteenth century dispute over whether state courts could
exercise jurisdiction over civil claims to enforce a federal penalty; it was not addressing
jurisdictional duties. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 440 (referring to the
Testa Court’s “leap” from Claflin’s discussion of state court powers to state court obligations);
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 47 n.b (9th ed. 2018) (“Justice Black’s opinion in Testa relied on
Claflin . . . even though the issue of a state-court obligation to hear federal claims was not there
presented.”). Indeed, sixteen years after Claflin, the Court reiterated the traditional rule that “the
courts of a State cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a . . . penalty for a
violation of a law of the United States.” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892).
130. See MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 275,
283 (Columbia Univ. Press 1949) (referring to the “comparatively few causes of action now
maintainable in either federal or state courts by virtue of express statutory provision,” and giving
examples of FELA suits and suits for wrongfully withheld wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)); id.
at 278–79 (discussing some provisions as to federal Indian laws that states did not resist); id. at
279 (indicating that whether Congress could force state courts to take jurisdiction over federal
claims had been an undecided issue); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1960) (“[T]he growth of the law in this area has been almost
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The 1910 amendments to the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability
Act131 (FELA), however, not only referred to concurrent jurisdiction over
claims under the statute,132 but also made such actions, when filed in state
courts, nonremovable.133 Most state courts voluntarily entertained FELA
actions, but the Connecticut Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad134 declined jurisdiction, stating that the
FELA was out of harmony with state policy.135 On direct review, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the “suggestion that the act of Congress is not in
harmony with the policy of the State . . . . When Congress . . . adopted
the act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby
established policy for all.”136 Thirty-five years later, in Testa v. Katt, the
Court extended the states’ compulsory jurisdiction to civil actions that
included penalties under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act,137 in
which Congress also contemplated that states could hear such claims but
did not explicitly require them to do so.138
exclusively confined to . . . the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.”). Congress’s effort to enlist
state courts in the enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act was rebuffed in many states, and
the Court eventually upheld the states’ right to do so. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying
text.
131. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–54, 54a, 55–60 (2012)).
132. Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 6, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 56). Reference to concurrent jurisdiction was not necessarily
uncommon, particularly in general jurisdictional provisions. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1875, ch.
137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (“That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature . . . arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78 (“That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of
the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in
dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”).
133. § 6, 36 Stat. at 291 (“The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this Act
shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States, and no case arising under this Act
and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the
United States.”).
134. 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id. at 57.
137. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942); see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (rejecting the
argument that the arguably penal nature of the claims was a valid excuse to refuse jurisdiction).
The requirement to hear FELA actions could be viewed as a more limited duty to hear what was
an “ordinary common-law negligence suit[] onto which federal standards of liability were
engrafted,” while in Testa “[t]he source of the action was unmistakably federal.” Collins, supra
note 39, at 169.
138. See § 205(c), 56 Stat. at 33 (“The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal
proceedings . . . and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all other proceedings under
section 205 of this Act.”); see also Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, ch. 325, sec. 108(b),
§ 205(e), 58 Stat. 632, 641 (amending the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) (“Any action
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Contemporaneous commentators treated Mondou and Testa as
addressing the question of whether Congress could force states to take
jurisdiction of federal statutory claims.139 In those cases, however, the
Court did not rely on any congressional intent to force states to entertain
the claims,140 and the applicable statutes did not use language of
compulsion.141 Indeed, the Court in several cases questioned whether
Congress by itself could require state courts to take jurisdiction, given
that Congress had no power to confer jurisdiction on the state courts.142

under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator . . . may be brought in any court of
competent jurisdiction.”).
139. See, e.g., WENDELL, supra note 130, at 279 (characterizing the issue in cases such as
Mondou as “whether Congress had the power to compel local courts to enforce rights created by
and solely dependent on federal statute . . . .”); id. at 284 (“[I]t is Congress which decides when
and in how many instances it shall require state courts to entertain suits for the assertion of rights
created by federal statute.”); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and
Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 966 (1947) (“The
definitive opinion of the Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt has once more projected into public
attention the long-standing controversy over the extent of congressional power to authorize or
compel state courts to hear claims arising under federal statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
140. See Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 385, 387 (1929)
(holding there was no violation of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause in the New York
court’s refusing jurisdiction over an FELA case that arose out of state between nonresidents, and
stating that “the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers’ Liability Act . . . does not purport to require
State Courts to entertain suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the
authority of the United States is concerned”); see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945)
(holding that a state court could decline an FELA case based on a state supreme court decision
that the court in which the suit was brought could entertain suits arising only within the city limits,
and reiterating Douglas’s statement that the statute did not purport to require state courts to
entertain suits arising under it); Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State
Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 204 (indicating with respect
to Mondou that “Congress had not . . . attempted to impose an obligation on state courts”); cf.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221–22 (1916) (allowing the state
practice of a nonunanimous jury in an FELA case, and stating that the state courts were not acting
as federal courts in such cases).
141. See sources cited supra notes 133, 138.
142. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934); Mondou v.
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1912) (“[T]here is not here involved any
attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect
their modes of procedure . . . .”). But cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973)
(characterizing Testa as holding that Congress could compel states to entertain federal statutory
actions); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL POWER 166 (2d ed. 1980) (agreeing with Palmore’s reading of Testa); Pfander, State
Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 198 (arguing that Congress has “power to ‘constitute’ state
courts as federal tribunals by conferring jurisdiction on them to hear federal claims”). Of course,
Congress can make certain jurisdictions exclusive to the federal courts. Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876).
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Rather, the compulsion seemed to result from the Supremacy Clause once
Congress created the action and did not exclude state court jurisdiction.143
The acknowledgement that state court jurisdiction was a matter of
state law suggested that states could deny jurisdiction based on valid
jurisdictional rules, such as when a court heard only cases that arose
within certain geographical limits or did not entertain claims where both
parties resided out of state.144 Such excuses would be “valid,” however,
only if the state’s jurisdictional rule were nondiscriminatory—that is, did
not discriminate between similar state and federal claims.145 Of course,
the similarity required to trigger the Testa obligation might be defined at
such a high level of generality that no federal claim would fail to be
similar to something in the arsenal of claims under state law able to be
heard in their courts of general jurisdiction, in which case the limits of
Testa would be rendered meaningless. But presumably Testa was being
serious when it failed to make its obligation mandatory in all cases under
federal law.
The Court, however, went a step beyond its nondiscrimination rule in
Haywood v. Drown,146 where it held that state courts of general
jurisdiction must entertain a state prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim
against individual corrections officers, even when the state courts’ denial
of jurisdiction is based on a nondiscriminatory state rule making prisoner
damages claims litigable only against the state itself, and in the state’s
court of claims.147 And it did so even though the federal courts remained
open for prisoners’ § 1983 claims.148 The Court’s earlier
nondiscrimination test at least had the advantage of showing somewhat
more deference to states’ structuring of their jurisdiction by only
requiring state courts to take jurisdiction if they heard similar state law
claims. Haywood narrowed this deference. The Court said that while “the
absence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral,

143. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–91 (1947) (relying expressly on supremacy);
McKnett, 292 U.S. at 232–34 (seeming implicitly to rely on supremacy in disallowing state
discrimination); Blackman, supra note 17, at 2062 (noting that the Supremacy Clause was “never
even mentioned” in McKnett).
144. See sources cited supra note 140.
145. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009).
146. 556 U.S. 729 (2009); see also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2046, 2059 (calling Haywood
a “sharp turn” and “deviant”).
147. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 733–34, 739–41. The statute did not purport to prevent federal
courts from hearing such claims. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 931 (“Haywood
establishes that an ‘analogous’ state-law claim need not be ‘identical’ to the federal claim.”
(quoting Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740 n.6)).
148. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 731.
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it is not sufficient.”149 If the jurisdictional rule somehow manifested
disagreement with the federal claim or hostility to it,150 it was invalid
under the Supremacy Clause.151 The Court thus will not allow the state
courts to deny jurisdiction over affirmative federal claims if the denial
either discriminates between federal and analogous state law claims or if
a nondiscriminatory jurisdictional rule suggests hostility to the
underlying federal rights.
B. The Supremacy Clause and State Court Jurisdictional Duties
The Court grounded these jurisdictional duties in the Supremacy
Clause, even absent a congressional command to the states to entertain
jurisdiction. Perhaps it is possible to read the Supremacy Clause to
require state courts with more or less sufficient existing jurisdiction to
entertain federal actions as if they were local actions152—which the Court
arguably does when it imposes either a nondiscrimination rule or a
broader non-hostility rule. On the other hand, one might still ask if forcing
jurisdiction on state courts serves a concrete purpose sufficient to
override state interests in controlling their own jurisdiction—particularly
when no duty to entertain affirmative federal statutory actions existed
prior to Mondou, when the Supremacy Clause receives ample vindication
by operating as a rule of decision in cases in which the state courts

149. Id. at 739 (“A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law,
no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”); id. at 739–41, 740 n.6 (finding jurisdiction sufficient
based on the state courts’ having general jurisdiction, their continuing to entertain § 1983 damages
claims against non-corrections officials, and their entertaining § 1983 injunction claims against
correctional officials).
150. Id. at 740 (“[H]aving . . . create[d] courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to
entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims
that it considers at odds with its local policy.”); id. at 741 n.8 (“[I]n the dissent’s conception . . . a
State could express its disagreement with (and even open hostility to) a federal cause of action,
declare a desire to thwart its enforcement, and achieve that goal by removing the disfavored
category of claim from its courts’ jurisdiction.”). It would be difficult to conclude that the state
statute manifested more hostility toward prisoner claims than the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 to -72 (1996) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)). The Court nevertheless saw differences between the
federal and state remedies as indicating state disagreement with federal policy. Haywood, 556
U.S. at 734, 737–38.
151. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740–41 (finding violation of the Supremacy Clause).
152. See Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1100
(2014) (stating that the defect in Haywood was not so much the state’s failure to subordinate its
law, “but . . . its failure to internalize federal law—to treat federal law as its own”); Vázquez &
Vladeck, supra note 4, at 934 (relying on the reasoning in Mondou and Testa that federal policy
is state policy).
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voluntarily take jurisdiction,153 and when Congress has not attempted to
compel the state courts’ exercise of jurisdiction.
The Supremacy Clause’s operation as a rule of decision remains the
most important and pervasive application of the Supremacy Clause visà-vis state courts. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his Haywood dissent,
the clause “provides only a rule of decision that the state court must
follow if it adjudicates the claim.”154 If a state court takes jurisdiction of
a case and misapplies or refuses to apply applicable federal law, a litigant
suffers a concrete harm by virtue of the change in the substantive law that
should govern the case and can seek vindication on direct review in the
Supreme Court.155 But as Justice Thomas stated, because the merits are
not decided in a refusal to take jurisdiction, the mere act of state refusal
does not undermine the enforcement of a federal law. 156 This is
particularly true as to the federal statutory claims here discussed—where
the federal courts are open and where Congress can be expected to
provide efficacious means of enforcement.
Obstacle preemption might be a variant of the Court’s supremacy
jurisprudence and could be an arguable basis for forcing jurisdiction.157
Under obstacle preemption, the Court may treat a state substantive or
procedural rule as inapplicable in a state court, not because of a logical
153. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction
of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 879 (1992) (arguing that the clause should be
treated primarily as a rule of decision); Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1771, 1773 (2012) (arguing the same); Jordan & Bader, supra note 46, at 1215 (arguing the same).
154. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 359–60, 375 (1990) (holding that the state trial
court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claim with prejudice after it determined that a local school
board could not be sued under § 1983); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at
446 n.8 (discussing Howlett, including Justice Thomas’s approving the result in Howlett, given
that the state court had dismissed the claim with prejudice); LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra
note 129, at 50 (noting that the “ruling of the Florida courts that the school board enjoyed an
immunity not recognized by federal law seems a straightforward violation of the Supremacy
Clause,” but also noting broader language as to state court duties to exercise jurisdiction).
156. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 756 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If the state court does not
reach the merits of the dispute for lack of statutory or constitutional jurisdiction, the preeminence
of federal law remains undiminished.”); see also Jordan, supra note 153, at 1797 (“Of course, any
dismissal is disruptive at some level. But so long as the dismissal does not infringe on the ability
of the parties to pursue the claim elsewhere, that disruption should not be considered as rising to
the level of constitutional concern.”).
157. The effect of federal law in trumping logically inconsistent state law may be
denominated a form of conflict preemption. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
852, 854 (2011) (treating so-called obstacle preemption as a different form of conflict
preemption); Nelson, supra note 33, at 266–76 (finding a lack of historical support for a
constitutional doctrine of obstacle preemption); id. at 276–90 (indicating also that there generally
is no reason to import a doctrine of obstacle preemption into a congressional statute that does not
address preemption).
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inconsistency with federal law, but because the state rule may “frustrate[]
the full effectiveness of federal law.”158 Despite some suggestive
language in Haywood,159 however, the Court has not squarely relied on
obstacle preemption in the Testa line of cases. Perhaps this is because—
as Professor Gil Seinfeld has pointed out—it is difficult to argue that a
plaintiff’s having to repair to a federal court to bring her federal claim is
much of an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law.160
Sometimes the Court has used obstacle preemption to tell state courts
that they must follow certain aspects of federal procedure when the state
courts entertain a federal cause of action. For example, in Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown Railroad,161 the Court held that the state court was
required to follow federal practice with respect to having the jury rather
than the judge decide whether the defendant had fraudulently obtained a
release of the plaintiff’s FELA claim.162 While one might question the
results in such cases,163 the procedural preemption cases generally
158. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941) (“Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”).
159. The Haywood Court mentioned that “[a] jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device
to undermine federal law,” and said in a footnote that the dissent’s approach would allow states
deliberately to implement a desire to thwart enforcement of federal law. Haywood, 556 U.S. at
739, 741 n.8; see also Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1093 (seeing the thwarting of federal policy as
one of two rationales in Haywood); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:
“Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1775 (1992) (seeing state refusals of jurisdiction as
impeding the enforcement of federal law).
160. See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1095 (“[I]t is not clear how a federal cause of action is
‘undermined’—and it certainly is not nullified—by a rule that requires the plaintiff to walk across
the street to the federal courthouse . . . .”); Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of
American Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1325 (2015) (arguing in a similar fashion);
see also Jordan, supra note 153, at 1773 (arguing that obligations of state courts to hear federal
claims and claims of other states should be based on prejudice, not discrimination or interference);
Sandalow, supra note 140, at 206 (“Yet it is difficult to perceive the federal interest that justifies
so substantial an intrusion upon the power of the states to determine the purposes to be served by
agencies of state government.”). Most federal question cases can be removed, thus indicating that
Congress itself has not seen plaintiffs’ retaining a state forum for federal claims as a concern.
FELA cases are an exception, so perhaps Congress wanted to give plaintiffs the advantage of
choosing their forum for convenience or because they perceive a particular court as more
favorable. Reinforcing a plaintiff’s choice of a state forum for a federal cause of action, however,
seems a weak reason to override states’ determinations of their own courts’ jurisdiction. Cf. Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit, 63
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1067–69 (2014) (discussing the maximization of plaintiff recovery and forum
choice as insufficient rationales for forcing states to entertain other states’ causes of action).
161. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
162. Id. at 363.
163. Cf. Hart, supra note 31, at 508 (“Some differences in remedy and procedure are
inescapable if the different governments are to retain a measure of independence in deciding how
justice should be administered.”). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at
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involve telling a state court that a federal practice rather than a state
practice governs in a federal cause of action that the state courts have
elected to entertain.164
Obstacle preemption, moreover, often relies on the Court’s
determination of congressional intent.165 As noted above, however, the
Testa line of cases has not generally purported to rely on congressional
intent.166 Rather, the Court has relied on what it seems to perceive as the
self-executing operation of the Supremacy Clause once Congress passes
a statute. The indifference to congressional intent is manifest in
453–59 (discussing procedural preemption cases); Nelson, supra note 33, at 265–76 (discussing
problems with obstacle preemption).
164. While most such cases involve the state courts’ entertaining the federal claim on the
merits, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), is an apparent exception. In Felder, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed a state court’s holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must comply with a state
notice of claims requirement. Id. at 134. The Court held that the state procedural prerequisite was
an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law because it imposed an exhaustion of state remedies
requirement, id. at 138, which the Court had previously held to be incompatible with suits brought
under § 1983 in the federal courts, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). The
U.S. Supreme Court stated that “Wisconsin . . . may not alter the outcome of federal claims it
chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that
are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court . . . .” Felder, 487 U.S. at 152. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, had indicated that the plaintiff could pursue his claim in a
federal court. Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Wis. 1987), rev’d, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
165. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (“We also recognized . . . that to deprive railroad workers of
the benefit of a jury trial . . . ‘is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has
afforded them.’” (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943))); NELSON, supra
note 157, at 860 (noting that the Court usually presents obstacle preemption as a rule of statutory
interpretation, rather than directly linking it to the Supremacy Clause).
166. Some scholars nevertheless read the Testa line of cases as relying on an implicit
congressional command to state courts to entertain the causes of action that were at issue in those
cases. See REDISH, supra note 142, at 129–30 (arguing that although Congress rarely expresses a
clear intent, statutes should be read to impose a duty on state courts); Redish & Sklaver, supra
note 3, at 93 (viewing Testa as illustrating an implicit congressional command to state courts to
hear claims brought under federal statutes). The compulsion on state courts then would arise
primarily through Article I and the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the Supremacy Clause
operating to resolve the conflict between the federal statute and state law. See, e.g., Redish &
Sklaver, supra note 3, at 89 (seeing federal commandeering of state courts as “appropriately
grounded in a combination of an enumerated power and auxiliary authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause”). To justify the presumption of a state court duty in the face of congressional
silence, the argument effectively seems to be that the state’s refusing to take jurisdiction is an
obstacle to the enforcement of the federal statute. See id. (indicating that state refusal to take
jurisdiction would undermine the efficient enforcement of federal rights). Professors Martin
Redish and Steven Sklaver suggest that were state courts not compelled to hear affirmative federal
claims, “[e]ither the entire litigation burden would fall on the federal courts, or those whom
Congress sought to protect would be unable to efficiently enforce their federally created rights.”
Id. at 93. It is difficult, however, to see how requiring the federal government to bear more of the
costs of enforcing its own laws is a significant obstacle to enforcing federal law. See supra text
accompanying notes 157–60; infra note 168.
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Haywood, which compelled the state courts to take jurisdiction of § 1983
claims. An explicit or implicit congressional purpose that the state courts
must take jurisdiction over § 1983 claims would be difficult to discover.
Rather, the legislative history manifests a desire that federal courts be
available to make up for state court deficiencies.167 True, Congress
apparently contemplated state court jurisdiction in actions under the
FELA and the Emergency Price Control Act, at issue in Mondou and
Testa respectively. But having adverted to such jurisdiction, Congress
still did not also purport to compel it. Perhaps matters would be different
if Congress were to do what it heretofore has not done—to compel states
to exercise jurisdiction over a federal cause of action—but the question
would remain as to whether such a congressional command violated
structural federalism constraints.168
167. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–87 (1961) (discussing legislative history),
overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Act of Apr.
20, 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (“[A] proper proceeding for redress . . . [is] to be prosecuted
in the several district or circuit courts of the United States.”).
168. Under anticommandeering doctrine, a statute that might otherwise appear to advance
legitimate Article I purposes may nevertheless violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see
also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2035–36 (distinguishing between the validity of Congress’s
compelling state courts to exercise jurisdiction they do not have and jurisdiction they do have).
Several scholars have noted the difficulty of distinguishing the kind of judicial commandeering
that occurs under Testa from the legislative and executive commandeering that the Court has
forbidden. See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 116–17 (arguing against
anticommandeering cases by agreeing that a distinction between judicial and other types of
commandeering was unjustifiable); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits
of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 216–17 (arguing against anticommandeering cases by
stating that judicial and administrative commandeering similarly interfere with state autonomy
and use state resources). The discussion in Part I of this Article suggests that the Supremacy
Clause should not be read to allow Congress to impose jurisdictional duties on state courts.
Professor Roderick Hills has argued, moreover, that the anticommandeering norm appropriately
requires the federal government to bargain with the states if it wants to avail itself of their
regulatory services, and it will generally be able to do so when this is an efficient outcome. See
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893 (1998); see also id. at
857–58, 901–15 (justifying anticommandeering with reference to distributional concerns and
speech interests of nonfederal governments). While Hills indicates that the federal government
has no need to commandeer state judicial services, he suggests that a state’s discrimination as
between federal claims and other states’ claims may be akin to harassment. Id. at 928–31. Hills
argues, however, that a nondiscrimination norm should be limited to a comparison of how the
state courts treat claims of other states, not a comparison of how the state treats its own claims.
Id.; see also Hart, supra note 31, at 538 (arguing against a state’s ability “to appropriate the
services of the federal courts” by making federal duties into elements of state law claims). As to
states’ duties to hear other states’ claims, see Jordan, supra note 153, at 1805–15, which argued
that states should be obliged to take on sister state claims only when an adequate alternative forum
is unavailable. See also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 160, at 1065–67 (arguing similarly).
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Given the absence of significant harms to the enforcement of federal
statutes arising from state court jurisdictional refusals, the rationale for
state court jurisdictional duties seems to rest on the states’ demonstrating
“discrimination”169 or “hostility” to federal law in and of itself. As
Professor Terrance Sandalow said, “The Court’s reliance on the
Supremacy Clause appears to come to no more than it would be unseemly
for the state to refuse recognition to rights conferred by federal law . . . .”
170
One might think that a state’s evincing a wrongful attitude toward the
federal government without significant negative effects on the
enforcement of federal law would be an insufficient justification for
forcing states to take jurisdiction over federal statutory claims. But
Professor Seinfeld argues that the Testa line is correct because the state
court refusal to take jurisdiction expresses the “wrong view of the
national government, federal law, or our union.”171 Requiring state courts
to take jurisdiction reinforces the expressive value of citizenship in the
union.172
Professor Seinfeld’s argument draws on so-called expressive theories
of law,173 under which courts are said to be able to strike down
government action because its action expresses a wrongful attitude
toward persons or other governmental institutions.174 Expressive theories
perhaps have the most prevalence in discussions of the Establishment
Clause and Equal Protection, where government action may convey a
169. Cf. Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a
Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 581 (2011) (arguing for a relational view of
federalism that “serves as the basis for generating a behavioral norm imposed on state courts not
to discriminate against federal law”).
170. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 206 (referring to Mondou and Testa); see also NELSON,
supra note 157, at 853 (characterizing Felder and Howlett as cases in which the “courts might
find preemption not because state law contradicts the explicit terms of a valid federal statute, but
rather because the rationale for the state law rests on a rejection of the rationale for the federal
statute”). But see Sandalow, supra note 140, at 207 (suggesting that Congress might be able to
impose an obligation on state courts as to federal statutory actions).
171. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1088.
172. Id. at 1087, 1093, 1103 (seeing cases like Haywood as correct due to the affront to the
constitutional value of union, rather than based on a traditional view of supremacy as meaning
that federal law trumps state law); see Seinfeld, supra note 160, at 1325 (distinguishing “[t]he
interest in union” from a supremacy rationale).
173. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1363, 1364–73 (2000) (summarizing various expressive theorists’ views).
174. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520–21 (2000) (indicating that state action is required to
express appropriate attitudes toward persons and that the state and federal governments “are
obligated to express adequate conceptions of their relationships with other governmental units”);
see also id. at 1547 (indicating that a reprobated expression does not necessarily have to be one
that the government actors intended to communicate).
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message of religious preference or second-class citizenship.175 For
example, a government religious display may convey such a message,
and the Court may hold that the display violates the Establishment
Clause, even absent more tangible harms to the individuals challenging
the actions.176
Professor Seinfeld and others have attempted to import this wrongful
-message invalidation into federalism cases.177 Government expression
of attitudes that favor or disfavor federal versus state power, however, do
not carry the inherently degrading harms of racist or religion-preferring
government expressions.178 A regime of federalism entails that people
and various branches of government will differ in how favorably they
175. See Adler, supra note 173, at 1371 (disfavoring expressive theories, although noting
that “[t]here appears to be widespread agreement among constitutional scholars . . . that an
expressive theory is at least one component of a complete theory of the Equal Protection Clause”);
id. at 1372 (noting that “expressivism has been particularly influential” with respect to the
Establishment Clause).
176. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 56–57 (2008)
(discussing scholarly conceptions of wrongful discrimination as involving humiliation and a lack
of equal citizenship, and proposing a theory of wrongful discrimination as involving demeaning—
“a conjunction of expressive action and power”); Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1533–36
(citing equal protection cases that they see as primarily based on expressive harms rather than
more tangible harms); id. at 1544–45 (noting that the plaintiff does not need to feel bad; it is
enough that people understand the degrading message); id. at 1547–48 (citing cases regarding the
Establishment Clause).
177. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1551–55 (treating Dormant Commerce
Clause cases that distinguish disallowable from allowable state regulations based on protectionist
purposes as manifesting an expressive theory).
178. Cases that prohibit states from discriminating against federal contractors generally are
not so much trying to tease out antifederal animus as a stand-alone wrong, but rather trying to
figure out whether a state is attempting to make the federal government (through persons who
contract with it) pay a disproportionate subsidy to the state—that is, disproportionate to the burden
the state places on like economic activity. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536,
544 (1983). Indeed, even some facial discrimination is allowed where the Court perceives that a
tax overall equalizes taxes between the federal contractor and other economic actors. See, e.g.,
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990). By contrast, a state court’s failing to
take jurisdiction of federal causes of action that can be entertained in the federal courts is not
trying to impose a disproportionate share of state expenses on the federal government.
One strand of the federal/state nondiscrimination caselaw requires states to give the same tax
exemptions to federal retirees as to state retirees and does not seem to address the state’s placing
disproportionate burdens on the federal government. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,
489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989). This line of doctrine has been criticized because the state treats federal
employees the same as private employees. See id. at 819–20, 828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting
the majority for “the virtually automatic rejection of anything that can be labeled
‘discriminatory’”); see also Hills, supra note 168, at 932 (“It is difficult to see how Michigan is
somehow taxing federal interests because it does not provide the same subsidy to former federal
officers that it provides to state officers.”). Professor Seinfeld cites Davis as supporting his
expressive theory. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1107–08.
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view various rights and their sources.179 The state and federal
governments’ enforcement of their own laws through their own
instrumentalities is a general feature of the federal system, and it would
be difficult to determine which views as to the limits of such separate
implementation should count as inherently reprobated. For example,
some scholars have purported to justify anticommandeering doctrine,
which says that the federal government cannot force state legislatures to
enact state laws or the state executive to “execute” federal law, as justified
by Congress’s wrongful expression of the subordination of the states.180
Professor Seinfeld, by contrast, disagrees with the anticommandeering
decisions,181 but sees states’ resistance to hearing affirmative federal
claims as expressing an improper message of refusal to recognize the
pervasive power of the federal government.182

179. Cf. Copeland, supra note 169, at 525 (agreeing with cases such as Testa, but
characterizing federalism “as a system of governance that gives a larger polity’s geographical
subunits the ability to articulate alternative substantive norms than those articulated by the
national polity”); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 160, at 1070 (“[S]tates as political
communities exercising sovereignty within a particular territory routinely and legitimately prefer
their own law and policies to those of other states, and they expect other states to do the same.”);
id. at 1083 (“Madisonian separation of powers contemplates a measure of interbranch hostility—
hostility that inherently encompasses the source (in another branch) and content of decisions (i.e.,
not the same decisions that this particular branch would make).”).
180. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1560–61 (arguing that the rationale for
anticommandeering must be expressive, given that Congress can accomplish similar results by
preemption and conditional spending); Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New
Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2000) (suggesting
an expressive theory given the criticism that the doctrine “does not . . . protect the states’ power
of regulatory initiative in any field”); id. at 1330–31 (indicating that commandeering might give
rise to perceptions that states are puppets of the federal government). Compare Hills, supra note
168, at 856–91 (stating that conditional spending, unlike commandeering, requires the federal
government to bargain with the states if it wants to use the state regulatory apparatus), and id. at
900 (arguing that preemption is less harmful to useful nonfederal political activity than
commandeering), with Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 101 n.91 (faulting Hills’s reasoning on
the ground that there are not differential holdout problems as between preemption and
commandeering), and Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1562 (acknowledging force to
Hills’s arguments but saying that the point requires empirical insight and that the Court talks in
terms of expressive values).
181. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1134–35; cf. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, at 95
(requiring state courts to implement federal law appropriately reflects “the need for dominance of
the federal government over the state judiciaries”).
182. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1131 (“[T]he difficulty with state statutes that rest on a thin
conception of citizens’ kinship with the federal government is not so much that they are misguided
or dangerous as that they trade in a notion that simply isn’t true.”). But see Jessica Bulman-Pozen
& Heather R. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1291, 1297 (2009)
(arguing that commandeering may provide more effective opportunities for states to dissent from
federal policies than allowing states to opt out of federal programs).
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At least in the area of federalism, an expressive theory “is an awfully
loose concept with which to make legal decisions”—as Professors Adler
and Kreimer observed in objecting to anticommandeering decisions.183
“A federal statute seems to (objectively) say the right thing about
federalism just insofar as it is otherwise justified on federalism
grounds.”184 The expressive rationale is not sufficient to justify the Testa
line of cases.185
III. CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED REMEDIES IN STATE COURTS
A. Development of the Crain Line of Cases
The statutory cases associated with Testa v. Katt look even more
anomalous when one takes into account that the Court did not (at least
prior to Haywood) require similar state court conformity as to affirmative
causes of action to enforce the Constitution.186 As to affirmative remedies
for official wrongdoing violating the Constitution, the state and federal
courts have each largely followed their own lights. This was partly due
to the fact that the Constitution traditionally was not seen itself as creating
causes of action.187
There were, however, a few exceptions. As discussed above, in
Contract Clause cases such as Poindexter v. Greenhow, the Court forced
states on direct review to maintain certain remedies that were already in
place at the time of contracting. Subsequently, in General Oil Co. v.
Crain, the Court held that a state court could not disallow an injunction
action against a state official who collected an inspection fee alleged to
violate the Commerce Clause.188 Similarly, in Ward v. Board of County
Commissioners,189 the Court required a state court to entertain an
assumpsit action on behalf of a group of Native Americans to recover
taxes alleged to have been coercively collected and that violated the
183. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 141 (writing with reference to anticommandeering
theories, which they claim are unjustified).
184. Id. at 142 (addressing more generally “an intrinsic, expressive theory of federalism” in
the context of anticommandeering).
185. Of course, one may argue that Testa should have continuing force as a long-standing
precedent absent an especially strong showing that it was erroneous. Perhaps this Article has made
that showing. But even if not, one should avoid extending state obligations, as occurred in
Haywood and as proposed by Professors Vázquez and Vladeck.
186. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 936 (arguing that constitutional claims present
a better case for requiring state court jurisdiction than statutory claims, given that Congress has
incentives to provide adequate enforcement of its statutes).
187. Suits under § 1983 were infrequent prior to the Court’s broadening of the statute in
Monroe v. Pape. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170, 180, 183 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
188. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 214, 225–26, 231 (1908).
189. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
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taxpayers’ vested right that their lands be free of taxation.190 In still other
cases, the Court required states to supply refund remedies where a state
tax violated federal law, although most such cases involved relief within
an existing state law cause of action wherein the state court had,
according to the Court, erred on the merits in disallowing a monetary
remedy.191
B. Characteristics of Constitutionally Required Remedies Cases
The Crain line of cases takes its justification in the constitutional
necessity of affirmative remedies in some contexts. The cases tend to
involve the Court’s holding that certain state or local monetary exactions
violated federal law and that certain remedies were constitutionally
required.192 The duty to repay illegal exactions presents a good case for
the constitutional necessity of an affirmative remedy and at the same time
is relatively easy to administer through direct review of the state courts.
The notion of constitutional necessity also suggests that the states need
not supply such remedies if the federal courts are readily available to
supply constitutionally adequate remedies.193
1. When State Taxes Violate Federal Law
First, the Court’s compelled remedies decisions generally involved
remedies for state monetary exactions where the Court treated the
exaction as violating specific federal law. For example, the Virginia
Coupon Cases required the state courts to supply tort actions against tax
collectors because the state’s elimination of the duty to accept the interest
coupons on state-issued bonds in payment of taxes violated the Contract
Clause, as did the state courts’ elimination of tort remedies.194 The denial
190. Id. at 23 (finding that the state court determination that the taxes were voluntarily paid
was without fair and substantial support); id. at 24 (stating that no statutory authority for the suit
was needed given that the collection was not voluntary and also that the county was liable even
as to monies paid over to the state); see also Hart, supra note 31, at 507 (treating Ward as
exemplifying the principle that the Supremacy Clause “makes plain that if a state court undertakes
to adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance with whatever federal law is applicable”).
191. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1993); McKesson
Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51 (1990).
192. While most cases involved taxes violating the Constitution, sometimes the tax also
violated federal statutes. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244–
45, 47 (1931) (requiring a refund in case of violations of federal statute as to taxation of national
banks and equal protection).
193. The Crain line of cases thus accommodates both constitutional requirements and state
autonomy. It also reflects concerns of practical federalism in that the tax refund obligation is not
difficult to police by direct review.
194. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 282–83, 302–03 (1885).
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of the tort remedy also violated the Fourteenth Amendment.195 Similarly,
in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,196 the Court insisted that the
state provide a refund remedy because the Equal Protection Clause
required it.197 The plaintiff bridge company alleged that the county
assessed its property at full value, while all owners of like property were
taxed at 55%.198 The state court had said the remedy under state law was
to get the assessments of others raised.199 Given that the taxpayer had no
judicial means of getting other parties’ assessments raised, the Supreme
Court said, “[i]n substance and effect the decision of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in this case upholds the violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the injury of the Bridge Company.”200 Other tax cases also
found that refunds were constitutionally required, often relying on the
Due Process Clause.201
2. When States Internalize an Unjust Benefit and Its Return Can Be
Easily Administered
One might ask why the Court did not merely require litigants to raise
their tax collection claims defensively in a state enforcement action to
collect the taxes. If the state were to file a judicial action to collect taxes,
the taxpayer could raise federal defenses as a matter of the normal
operation of the Supremacy Clause. Governments, however, may
generally enforce taxes against the property of the delinquent taxpayer
without the necessity of first going to court. And they may effectively
compel payment by threats of large penalties in the event of nonpayment.
As a result, defensive remedies in a state enforcement action often might
not have presented a viable option for the taxpayer. Post-collection or
post-payment trespass actions and refund suits provide an affirmative

195. See id. at 279, 303.
196. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
197. Id. at 445–47.
198. Id. at 443–44.
199. Id. at 444.
200. Id. at 446–47; see also id. at 446 (referring to equal protection).
201. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 365–66, 369 (1930) (holding that tax
exemption for certain Native American lands was protected by the Fifth Amendment and denial
of recovery was itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mo. Nat’l Bank of Billings v.
Yellowstone Cty., 276 U.S. 499, 501, 504–05 (1928) (holding that a refund was required for
unequal taxes paid by a federally chartered bank; taxes had been alleged to violate the federal
statute, equal protection, and due process); see also Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 284
U.S. 23, 30 (1931) (indicating that taxing coal with different market values at the same value
violated due process, and holding that the taxpayers were entitled to readjustment of their
assessments to put them on the basis of equality with due regard to differences in value).
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vehicle for raising a defense that would theoretically have been raised in
an enforcement action.202
There are, however, other extrajudicial illegal invasions of person and
property by the state besides tax collection, and not all of them give rise
to such clear requirements of monetary remedies. For example, a trespass
action for an illegal search or arrest may often be unavailable or
ineffective due to qualified immunities of the individual officers.203 In the
case of tax collection, however, the state has deliberately internalized an
easily measured monetary benefit, and a government’s refusal to repay it
if the tax is illegal (and if the taxpayer follows proper procedures to
recover the illegal tax) is to insist on retaining an unjust gain. But if one
gets much beyond tax collection and a few similar areas such as clear
takings of property—an area that Professor Richard Seamon has
explored204—the constitutional compulsion for monetary remedies is
often cloudier and harder to administer by a clear rule. 205 This is not to
say that monetary remedies might not be constitutionally required in such
other cases, but rather that the circumstances in which they are
constitutionally required pose a more difficult question, and one that may
202. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 295 (1885) (“Although the plaintiff below
was nominally the actor, the action itself is purely defensive.”); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young,
60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2010) (suggesting that the underlying suit in Young made it into
federal court because it involved a traditional tool of equity—the injunction to restrain
proceedings at law, or antisuit injunction—and that by seeking an antisuit injunction, a potential
defendant at law can become a plaintiff in equity and present a federal defense in an affirmative
posture); cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1383 (1953) (discussing the need to
distinguish plaintiffs who are simply trying to get government help from those trying to protect
themselves from extrajudicial governmental coercion).
203. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
204. Professor Seamon has argued, based in part on the tax refund cases, that a state must
make available reasonably certain and adequate remedies for takings. See Seamon, supra note 17,
at 1114–15 (explaining that, under the Just Compensation Clause, remedies are always required
for takings); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF.
L. REV. 933, 936–37 (2019) (agreeing on the necessity of takings remedies, but noting that it is
not clear that judicial action as opposed to a legislative or administrative remedy is required).
When the government occupies or purports to take title to property, the requirement of
compensation is clear and relatively easy to administer. Regulatory takings, however, present a
more difficult area as to liability and amount of compensation. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 706 (1999) (“[T]he question submitted to the
jury . . . was . . . whether, in light of all the history and the context of the case, the city’s particular
decision to deny Del Monte Dunes’ final development proposal was reasonably related to the
city’s proffered justifications.”); see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 251–57 (2010) (discussing regulatory takings issues).
205. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 557 (2007) (refusing to recognize a Bivens
remedy for alleged retaliation by federal officials for the plaintiff’s refusal to renew an easement,
based in part on the difficulty of defining the cause of action).
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be more contingent on the particularities of the case.206 As Professor
Henry Hart observed, “offensive remed[ies] . . . introduce[] [problems of]
competing public interests. . . . [I]f not . . . simply for restitution, [money
damages] may involve grave issues of possible discouragement of official
action in good faith.”207
Outside of the tax and related contexts, then, the federal courts have
generally supplied constitutional remedies through their own causes of
action where remedies may be shaped to take account of such competing
interests. In § 1983 actions, for example, the federal courts have tempered
claims for remedies with concerns for unfairness to officers, for deterring
vigorous official action, and for preserving governmental resources. And
when the federal courts do award § 1983 damages remedies in particular
cases, they are not necessarily declaring that the remedy is
constitutionally required as opposed to merely constitutionally and
statutorily appropriate.208 The exact scope of constitutional compulsion
may appropriately be left indeterminate. By contrast, decisions in the
more limited Crain line of cases give a clearer indication that the
Constitution requires a particular remedy or an adequate substitute.
3. When Federal Jurisdiction Is Unavailable or Disfavored
Even assuming a rule-like requirement for affirmative state court
remedies in state tax cases, one still might ask why the state courts have
been required to supply such remedies for taxes violating the federal
Constitution rather than having the lower federal courts themselves
supply them. The explanation may lie at least in part in the uncertainties
and disfavored status of federal court jurisdiction over state tax cases.
These difficulties could arise (a) from amount in controversy
requirements; (b) from the uncertainties in sovereign immunity doctrine;
and (c) from congressional and Supreme Court preferences for state court
tax remedies.
(a) General federal question jurisdiction, in addition to diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, had an amount in controversy requirement until
1980.209 In the Contract Clause cases discussed above, Poindexter v.
206. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 948–50. The line of cases associated with Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), provides a federal court backstop for certain intentional torts that
are unjustified and not immunized. The requirement, however, is fairly case-specific.
207. Hart, supra note 31, at 523; see also id. at 525 (noting that, at the time he was writing,
the Court “on its own motion” had been unwilling to recognize a right of action to recover
damages for violation of the Constitution “other than by way of restitution”).
208. For example, it is unclear that the Constitution requires damages for discharges from
public employment in violation of the First Amendment. Nor does the Constitution require
damages against municipalities, punitive damages against individuals, or attorneys’ fees.
209. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1437.
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Greenhow and Chaffin v. Taylor, the amounts claimed were well below
the then-applicable over-$500 amount in controversy requirement.210 The
state court claims in Ward v. Board of County Commissioners similarly
would not have met the requisite jurisdictional amounts.211 Thus, in many
cases in the Crain line, no federal forum was available.
(b) Crain itself may appear to have required a state remedy when a
federal remedy was arguably available. Tennessee had imposed a perbarrel inspection fee on oil stored in state, and the state made challenges
to the fee difficult by way of penalties for nonpayment and the need to
file multiple refund actions.212 General Oil, a Tennessee company,213
sought an injunction based on the Commerce Clause to stop a state
officer’s collection of the fee as to oil to be sold out of state in interstate
commerce.214 The state court said no cause of action existed because of
sovereign immunity as provided in a state statute and as interpreted by
the state court.215 On direct review, the United States Supreme Court held
that the state court could not give the individual collector a sovereign
immunity defense to the injunctive action brought in state court.216
Ex parte Young,217 which was decided the same day as Crain,
suggested that a federal question cause of action in a lower federal court
for injunctive relief might have been available against the defendant
officer in Crain despite the lack of diversity between the parties and in
spite of the defense of sovereign immunity.218 Federal question
jurisdiction, however, may have been less than clear on the facts of Crain,

210. See supra note 127. The Court also held in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885),
that a suit under the predecessor to § 1983 would not be available for a claim under the Contract
Clause. Id. at 322–23; see supra note 128.
211. See Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 18 (1920) (indicating there were 67
plaintiffs); id. at 20 (indicating the amount claimed was $7,823.35); see also RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1436–37 (indicating the amount was over $2,000 from 1887 to 1911,
and over $3,000 from 1911 to 1928); id. at 1445–46 (indicating that aggregation of claims of more
than one plaintiff was not generally allowed).
212. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 213, 215 (1908) (describing penalties for unpaid
taxes and the necessity of multiple actions to recover amounts paid).
213. Id. at 212 (statement of the case).
214. Id. at 214–15.
215. Id. at 216. In Crain, the Tennessee court’s interpretation of the sovereign immunity
statute seemed contrary to prior Tennessee decisions. See id. at 227. There can be a strand of
forbidding bait and switch in tax cases, where a refund remedy appears to be available and is then
withdrawn. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 523 U.S. 106, 111 (1994).
216. Crain, 209 U.S. at 228. The Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim on the merits.
Id. at 231 (indicating it was treating the case in line with Commerce Clause taxation cases).
217. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
218. See id. at 143.
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at least at the time the oil company initiated its state court action and
perhaps even after the decision in Young.219
In the post-Young case of Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.
Musgrove,220 when relief in a federal court was more clearly available,
the Court did not require the state court to entertain a Crain-like
injunction action.221 In Musgrove, the railroad sought an injunction in
state court against the collection of a tax that the railroad claimed violated
its contract with the state.222 The state court, similar to the Tennessee
court in Crain, held that sovereign immunity barred the action.223 When
the railroad sought review in the United States Supreme Court, the Court
held that the state court’s sovereign immunity holding was an adequate
state ground to uphold the judgment and denied review.224 The Court
subsequently upheld the railroad’s challenge to the tax in a case
originating in the lower federal court under federal question
jurisdiction.225 In Musgrove, then, the Supreme Court directed the
taxpayer to the lower federal court rather than forcing the state court to
take jurisdiction of an injunction action. Musgrove therefore suggests that
the result in Crain may have been founded on doubts about the
availability of a lower federal court in which to make a similar challenge.
219. See Crain, 209 U.S. at 226 (“If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national
courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its
courts . . . without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to
prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.
ET AL., supra note 39, at 760 (“The majority’s suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment would
have prevented the oil company from obtaining an injunction in federal court is puzzling, for on
the very same day the Court decided Ex parte Young . . . .”). There may also have been some
questions as to the scope of equitable actions after Young. See Harrison, supra note 202, at 1008
(indicating that Young was an example of allowing a party threatened with an enforcement action
to raise its defense to the action by way of an antisuit injunction). Both before and after Young,
there remained concerns about federal injunctions against state taxes. See, e.g., Nat’l Private
Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 589 (1995) (citing cases); Matthews v.
Rogers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932) (holding that no federal equity action to enjoin collection of an
allegedly unconstitutional tax was available where the taxpayers could pay under protest and sue
the collector); Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 109–10 (1871) (holding that illegality of
a tax alone was not enough to justify an injunction action, given the state interest in collection).
220. 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam).
221. Id. at 900.
222. See Musgrove v. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 27 (Ga. 1948).
223. While the plaintiff did not clearly name an individual defendant, Georgia’s Supreme
Court did not base its decision on the pleading error. Id. at 35. The Georgia court, however,
decided that no action against the individual officer was available because the allegation was
based on contract. Id. at 36–37.
224. Musgrove, 335 U.S. at 900 (dismissing appeal because the judgment below was based
on a nonfederal ground adequate to support it), discussed in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra
note 39, at 760 n.6.
225. Georgia v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 301, 306 (1952).
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(c) But developments both before and after Musgrove made resorting
to federal courts a less viable option in challenges to state taxes. The 1937
Tax Injunction Act,226 which predated Musgrove, forbade most federal
court injunctive actions against state tax collection,227 and the Court
increasingly insisted that taxpayers pursue post-payment state-court
refund remedies in lieu of federal actions for injunctive, declaratory, or
monetary relief.228 And although the Tax Injunction Act indicated that
federal jurisdiction would reopen were state remedies not plain, speedy,
and efficient, the Court became more inclined to steer the actions to state
court and provide correction by direct review rather than by opening up
lower federal court jurisdiction.229
But even though federal law and federal courts substantially directed
tax challenges to state courts, the Supreme Court notably did not require
state-court conformity with the causes of action and remedies that a
federal court would have supplied if it had entertained such cases.230
Indeed, in National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission,231 the modern Court held that state-court § 1983 actions
were unavailable in challenges to state taxes so long as the state had an
adequate post-payment refund procedure of its own.232 Although the case

226. Pub. L. No. 75-332, 50 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)).
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 407–11 (1982) (holding
that the Tax Injunction Act also encompasses declaratory judgments); Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981) (holding that federal courts, by reason of
comity, would not take jurisdiction of an action seeking damages for alleged discriminatory and
retaliatory assessments; Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1945)
(holding that sovereign immunity barred a state statutory refund action in federal court).
229. See, e.g., Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 (1981) (holding that the
taxpayer could not sue in federal court for an injunction against an assessment alleged to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that the state refund action took two years and
provided no interest; plaintiff could raise her objections in the state court proceeding).
230. A federal court would have occasion to entertain a taxpayer’s state tax case only if the
plaintiff were able to find a way around the statutory and comity-based restraints on jurisdiction
described above. See Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 591 n.6
(1995) (indicating that there may be “extraordinary circumstances” when federal injunctive or
declaratory relief would be available).
231. 515 U.S. at 582. National Private Truck Council modified the result in Dennis v.
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), which on direct review reversed a state court’s determination in a
tax case that § 1983 was not available for Commerce Clause challenges. Id. at 442.
232. While the Court in National Private Truck Council held that a state court action for
injunctive or declaratory relief was not available under § 1983 if the court provided adequate tax
remedies, it also reiterated that a § 1983 claim for monetary relief was unavailable. Nat’l Private
Truck Council, 515 U.S. at 588 (“Though federal courts are obliged to hear § 1983 claims, it is
clear that they may not award damages or declaratory or injunctive relief in state tax cases when
an adequate state remedy exists.”). Denying a § 1983 remedy generally will mean that a court will
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did not implicate the Tax Injunction Act’s prohibition on federal
equitable relief, the Court relied on “the background presumption that
federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state
taxes.”233 The requirement on state courts was therefore to provide a
constitutionally adequate remedy.234 Thus the Crain line of cases did not
reflect any supposed Supremacy Clause requirement that the state courts
entertain the very same cause of action that the federal courts would have
entertained.
IV. MERGING THE CRAIN AND TESTA LINES OF CASES?
This Part evaluates the two strands of compulsion on the state courts
and their apparent integration in Haywood. The strand regarding state
court jurisdictional obligations in connection with federal statutory
actions associated with Testa v. Katt relies on the Supremacy Clause, and
its justification seems to be to correct the state courts’ lack of sufficient
respect for federal statutory causes of action. The justification does not
lie in the necessity of remedies for a particular federal law violation,
given that the state courts’ obligation under Testa exists even though the
federal courts are available to hear such claims.
The required-constitutional-remedies strand associated with General
Oil Co. v. Crain has been in some sense more modest. It has occasionally
required states to supply affirmative constitutional remedies via state law
causes of action. These remedies are required not because the Supremacy
Clause requires state conformity to the causes of action that the federal
courts might supply,235 but because other constitutional provisions—e.g.,
the Contract Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process
Clause—require affirmative remedies in some contexts. And because this
strand is concerned with constitutionally adequate remedies, the
requirements tend to surface when lower federal court jurisdiction is
disfavored or unavailable.
Section 1983 provides a crossover between the statutory and
constitutional lines of cases. On the one hand, a claim under § 1983 is a
federal statutory claim. On the other hand, the Court itself has turned
§ 1983 into an all-purpose vehicle for challenges to unconstitutional state
not award attorneys’ fees. Id. at 592 (“It follows that when no relief can be awarded pursuant to
§ 1983, no attorney’s fees can be awarded under § 1988.”).
233. Id. at 588.
234. Id. at 588–89. Congress’s limiting federal court jurisdiction may result in the state
courts’ having greater obligations to entertain constitutionally required remedies. Still, the
obligation on the state courts arises from the constitutional necessity of certain remedies rather
than Congress’s power to impose jurisdiction on the state courts.
235. Cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (treating the Crain cases as “a separate
line of Supremacy Clause cases”).
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and local governmental action.236 The decision in Haywood, by requiring
state courts to hear § 1983 claims, has the potential to make the Crain
line largely superfluous. State courts apparently are required to entertain
§ 1983 claims whether or not the state supplies different but
constitutionally adequate remedies, whether or not the § 1983 remedies
in the particular case are constitutionally required, and even though the
federal courts are clearly available to hear the claims under § 1983.
One might see this requirement of state court conformity regarding
affirmative constitutional claims as following from the decline of the
notion that the Constitution is largely enforced through common law and
equity actions, and its replacement with a more positive-law-based view
that the Constitution itself, or federal statutes such as § 1983, prescribes
the affirmative cause of action. Once identified as sourced in federal law,
the actions look more mandatory, particularly in light of the Testa line of
cases. State courts then might be required to supply the same causes of
action as the federal courts provide to address constitutional violations by
state and local government actors, not only under § 1983, but also for
habeas corpus and for so-called implied actions under federal law.237
Indeed, Professors Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that state courts
must entertain any federal civil claims that have not been made
exclusively federal by Congress.238
If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.239
Finding support in the recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana,240 they particularly would require states to supply habeas
corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners with claims under the exceptions to

236. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 936.
237. True, the federal habeas statute particularly addresses the federal courts. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2242 (2012). But Congress similarly focused on federal court actions in § 1983. See id.
§ 1343(3); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–82 (1961) (describing the “broader” aims of
Congress in enacting the statute), overruled in part by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Implied actions remain an avenue for bringing certain preemption claims. See, e.g.,
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002).
238. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911.
239. Id. at 935.
240. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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the nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,241 without regard to whether
habeas corpus is available in the federal courts.242
In Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court, on review of a state
court habeas proceeding, held nonretroactive under Teague the United
States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama243 disallowing
mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles.244 The Court had
decided Miller a half century after the state prisoner’s conviction.245 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prohibition on
mandatory life without parole for juveniles was indeed a retroactive
constitutional rule.246 On its facts, the Court merely reversed an incorrect
determination of applicable federal law in a habeas case that the state
court had entertained.247 In a prior case, the Louisiana Supreme Court had
stated that the standard for determining retroactivity set forth in Teague
applied “to ‘all cases on collateral review in our state courts,’” and had
decided that Miller was non-retroactive under Teague standards.248 In
Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed the lower
court’s dismissal based on that prior decision.249
Justice Kennedy, however, used expansive language in reversing the
Louisiana Supreme Court: “Where state collateral review proceedings
permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States
cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional
right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”250 Kennedy’s
statement implied a state court duty to entertain Teague-exception claims

241. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
242. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 928–29 (raising a question as to whether 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) should be read to allow for Teague exception claims, and concluding that it
should).
243. 567 U.S. 460, 476, 479–80, 489 (2012) (requiring an opportunity to consider age and
age-related characteristics, although still allowing for a possibility that a life sentence without
parole might be imposed) (assuming that such a sentence would be uncommon).
244. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.
245. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 732 (majority opinion).
247. See id. at 726; Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 909, 927.
248. State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834, 835–41 (La. 2013) (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v.
Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La. 1992)) (deciding that Miller was nonretroactive under
Teague standards).
249. State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264, 264 (La. 2014) (affirming the district court’s
denial of relief based on Tate), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
250. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–32; see id. at 729 (holding that when a new substantive
rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral
review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule) (“Teague’s conclusion . . . is best understood
as resting upon constitutional premises. That constitutional command is, like all federal law,
binding on state courts.”).
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so long as the state courts provide some form of post-conviction relief, 251
although it may be possible that the opinion would allow a state with
limited post-conviction remedies to avoid such a duty—as Justice
Thomas suggested.252 Professors Vázquez and Vladeck, however, go
beyond the Kennedy opinion, arguing that state courts must provide postconviction review for Teague-exception cases, even in the absence of
jurisdiction in state courts to grant habeas as a general matter.253
One might agree that the Constitution requires certain remedies, and
further agree that such actions include remedies for prisoners in custody
in violation of constitutional rights that constitute Teague exceptions.
Because the state continues to restrain the freedom of the prisoner, the
affirmative remedy via habeas corpus is somewhat defensive in nature,
as is true for affirmative remedies challenging illegal tax collection.254
And like a refund for an illegal tax, the requirement for the habeas remedy
at least arguably lends itself to fairly categorical application.
One need not necessarily agree, however, that the state courts have an
obligation to supply habeas—or to supply it for the identical issues that
federal courts entertain255—when the federal courts are available to hear
251. Cf. LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 68–69 (“The Court’s decision in
Montgomery might be taken to suggest that it is constitutionally mandatory for states to establish
post-conviction review procedures that are at least as broad as federal habeas corpus. Or it could
be taken for the narrower proposition that, once a state has adopted a process for collateral review,
that review must extend to all valid constitutional claims.”).
252. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“States can stop
entertaining claims alleging that this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions invalidated a sentence,
and leave federal habeas courts to shoulder the burden of adjudicating such claims in the first
instance. Whatever the desirability of that choice, it is one the Constitution allows States to
make.”). All states have some form of post-conviction relief that encompasses denials of
constitutional rights in some form. See 1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 2017-2018 § 1:4, at 7 (2017). In its amicus brief in
Montgomery, the United States reported that, “A majority of States use the Teague framework (at
least in part) to decide questions of retroactivity on state collateral review.” Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 33 n.12, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14280).
253. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 932 (“In our view, however, the better reading of
Haywood is as a holding that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to grant collateral relief
to state prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes a new rule falling within a Teague
exception—even if the state’s courts otherwise lack jurisdiction over any and all collateral
claims.”); id. at 933 (also arguing that a state court’s general jurisdiction over equity actions would
be sufficiently analogous to habeas to require a state to supply post-conviction remedies it did not
otherwise provide).
254. In the case of post-conviction review, however, the prisoner will have been incarcerated
pursuant to judicial proceedings. But finality interests of the state in continuing to detain a person
convicted under an unconstitutional statute seem weak.
255. See supra note 252. As Justice Thomas points out in his Haywood dissent, “[a] statute’s
jurisdictional status does not turn on its narrowness or its breadth,” but rather “on the grounds on
which the state-law dismissal rests and the consequences that follow from such rulings.” Haywood
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the prisoner’s claims.256 The Supreme Court, moreover, has repeatedly
disclaimed any requirement that states provide post-conviction relief, 257
as Professors Vásquez and Vladeck note.258 Rather, post-conviction relief
has followed the general historical pattern for affirmative remedies: the
federal courts have supplied such remedies themselves rather than forcing
state courts to supply them.259 By contrast, the cases that appear to force
jurisdiction as to affirmative remedies on the states have generally been
ones where lower federal court jurisdiction was questionable or
disfavored.
One argument for ignoring the availability of federal court remedies
is of course the Testa line of cases, which Haywood has imported into
constitutional remedies. But as argued above, the Supremacy Clause can
be amply vindicated by requiring the states to apply federal law properly
in cases they do entertain on the merits—as was true in Montgomery
itself. An additional argument for ignoring the availability of the federal
remedies relies on the Madisonian Compromise and the necessity of
certain constitutional remedies. Because Congress controls federal court
jurisdiction and could close it off, the argument is that state courts have
an obligation to supply affirmative remedies for federal law, particularly
constitutional violations.260 An argument for compulsory state court
jurisdiction based on constitutional necessity weakens, however, so long
as the federal courts are willing to supply such remedies. Indeed,
v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 774 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). A state court’s refusing to entertain
certain issues on habeas would not generally generate a preclusive effect. On the other hand, a
state court’s determining federal issues will generally lead to federal court deference under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
256. See Comment, State Court Withdrawal from Habeas Corpus, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081,
1086–87 (1966) (arguing that it makes sense for states to narrow state habeas “so that a prisoner
may obtain final adjudication of all claims in a federal court”).
257. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding there was no right
to adequate counsel on state post-conviction review, partly based on the fact that states were not
obliged to provide post-conviction proceedings).
258. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 910 n.22; id. at 927 n.93 (citing authority).
259. Professor Hart stated with respect to post-conviction relief,
the Court has spoken repeatedly of the obligation of the states to provide an
adequate corrective process for certain kinds of claims. But the Court has not so
far sought to enforce such an obligation by direct command to hear a claim,
apparently assuming rather that the ultimate sanction is federal habeas corpus.
Hart, supra note 31, at 508 n.59; see also Sandalow, supra note 140, at 210 (“The consistent
practice of the Court, on finding that a state provides no post-conviction remedy, has been to remit
prisoners to the federal district court where federal habeas corpus is available.”).
260. See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1145, 1151, 1154 (arguing that the
Madisonian Compromise supports strong state duties); Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911–
12, 938–39 (relying on the Madisonian Compromise).
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Professor Sandalow aptly questioned “whether it is appropriate to fashion
constitutional obligations of state courts on the remote possibility that
Congress may act in a manner destructive of constitutional rights.” 261
Proponents of strong state court duties may hope to find support from
Professor Hart’s conclusion in his famous Dialogue that state courts “are
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they
may be the ultimate ones.”262 Professor Hart maintained that Congress
has near plenary power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and he concluded that state courts would retain jurisdiction if Congress
succeeded in stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over the federal
constitutional cases in which he considered judicial review essential.263
A good bit of the Dialogue, however, is directed toward showing how the
federal courts should use, and have used, their remaining jurisdiction to
resist congressional jurisdiction stripping.264 The state courts are
presented as the last line of defense if Congress’s federal court
jurisdiction-stripping succeeds.265 But it does not follow from Hart’s
Dialogue that states must supply constitutionally required affirmative
remedies even when the federal courts are clearly available.266
261. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 209 (footnote omitted); see Jordan, supra note 153, at
1812 (reasoning that state court power to refuse to entertain federal claims may depend on whether
there is an established system of federal courts); see also LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note
129, at 68 (“If federal habeas is available as a backup, why should it matter if a state chooses to
provide narrower collateral relief in its own courts? Are Testa v. Katt and Haywood v. Drown
helpful in thinking about this question?”). Indeed, many Federal Courts scholars take the position
that state duties to supply habeas as to federal detention kick in only in the absence of federal
court remedies. See, e.g., Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 912–13, 941–43 (taking this
position, and arguing that it results from a presumption of congressional preference for federal
court remedies against federal officers).
262. Hart, supra note 202, at 1401; see, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1154 (relying
on Hart’s Dialogue); Seamon, supra note 17, at 1116 n.244 (relying on the same).
263. See Hart, supra note 202, at 1401.
264. See id. at 1374 (indicating that he would use statutory construction to allow anticipatory
challenges that raised issues that could be raised in defense to an enforcement action); id. at 1387–
95 (suggesting that the federal courts could provide and have provided relief under a general grant
of jurisdiction where Congress had stripped jurisdiction); id. at 1398 (indicating that the federal
courts have shown their readiness to determine the validity of a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus); id. at 1398–99 (indicating that “the Court should use every possible resource of
construction to avoid” allowing Congress to withdraw jurisdiction to effectuate unconstitutional
purposes); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787, 798 (2008) (falling back on general
habeas jurisdiction in holding unconstitutional certain restrictions on federal habeas as to federal
detainees); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601, 603 (1988) (reading a statute so as not to preclude
review of constitutional issues in the dismissal of a CIA employee).
265. See Hart, supra note 202, at 1401 (“If [the state courts] were to fail, and if Congress had
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really
would be sunk.” (footnote omitted)).
266. In The Relations between State and Federal Law, Hart took the Testa nondiscrimination
line as a given, and opined that Congress “[p]robably” could compel states to take jurisdiction
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Another argument for putting a first-line requirement on the state
courts is that the states have a procedural due process obligation to
remedy constitutional problems that they create.267 Thus, Professor
Seamon has argued that states cannot escape their own due process
obligation to make available takings remedies in their own courts when
the state has taken property for public use in violation of the Takings
Clause, even when the federal courts are available to hear the claims.268
As a matter of supplying procedural (or substantive) due process,
however, state and federal judicial process have often substituted for one
another.269 For example, state courts were often the only available forums
for certain actions against federal officers, such as trespass cases against
federal marshals.270 Because the cases often involved allegedly illegal
seizures, the plaintiffs frequently had strong claims for remedies.271 There
was not, however, an evident requirement that because federal officers
had caused the problem, the federal courts must necessarily supply the
even absent discrimination. Hart, supra note 31, at 507. In discussing affirmative causes of action
to enforce the Constitution, however, he stated, “[t]he states, it is plain, are free to give such
remedies as they choose for violations of federal rights by state officials, provided only that the
remedies do not conflict with any provision, express or implied, of federal law.” Id. at 523.
267. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1069.
268. Id. at 1069 (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause imposes on the
States remedial obligations that sometimes require the involvement of the States’ own courts. In
particular, the Due Process Clause requires that, when a State takes private property for public
use, the State must have a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate’ procedure for paying just
compensation.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.
2162 (2019))); id. at 1116–17 (“[T]he availability of federal-court remedies does not excuse a
State’s failure to provide its own remedies—either in its courts or by some other means—to the
extent required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Professor Seamon
argued that the Due Process Clause may obligate states to make the remedy available against itself
in its own courts. See id. at 1102. Until recently, federal courts generally would not entertain
takings claims where adequate state remedies existed—for reasons of lack of ripeness and
“because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194–95,
194 n.13. But the Court overruled Williamson County in Knick, when it held that a Takings claim
is ripe as soon as the government takes property without paying for it. 139 S. Ct. at 2177.
269. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1116 (noting that federal courts can often supply effective
remedies for due process violations); cf. id. at 1105, 1109 (noting flexibility of due process and
that states can provide alternative remedies if they are certain enough).
270. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice
Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2161, 2168 (2009) (indicating that prior to 1833, some
actions against federal customs collectors could be brought only in state courts).
271. See, e.g., Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10, 11–12 (1817) (affirming a state
court’s grant of replevin as to cargo that had been seized by federal officials without authority,
and indicating that federal jurisdiction was unavailable in the particular case). But cf. Seamon,
supra note 17, 1136–38 (arguing that federal courts have a procedural due process obligation to
supply remedies for, e.g., takings, that the federal government effectuates).
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affirmative remedies to fix them. And conversely, federal courts have
often provided a large share of the effective actions against state and local
officers, such as implied actions under § 1331, damages and injunctive
actions under § 1983, and habeas corpus.272 Due process in our federal
system thus has not necessarily required that judicial remedies be
available in the courts of the sovereign whose officers caused the
problem.
Finally, because states often entertain federal statutory claims and
often supply affirmative remedies for constitutional violations and postconviction relief, one might argue that there is little harm in requiring
states always to supply such claims, and in making the states conform
their causes of action more generally to those that the federal courts
supply. The notion of federalism, however, values states’ structuring of
their own institutions and encourages experimentation.273 Requiring
jurisdictional and cause-of-action conformity may discourage state
development of different responses to government-inflicted harms.
Professor Bator aptly asked, “[d]o we not derive enormous benefits from
having a variety of institutional ‘sets’ within which issues of federal
constitutional law are addressed?”274
Postconviction remedies offer an example of at least some benefits
from the institutional variety of which Bator speaks. State court habeas
actions often include claims that the federal courts do not generally
entertain. For example, many states provide post-conviction relief for
new evidence of innocence.275 All states have statutes providing for postconviction DNA testing.276 And some states are more lenient than federal
courts as to statutes of limitations277 and as to procedural defaults.278 The
federal courts, for their part, obviously remain specialized in the claims
cognizable on federal habeas. States, of course, could continue to supply
272. See, e.g., Ga. R.R. & Banking v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1952).
273. Bator, supra note 2, at 634.
274. Id.
275. BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 163 (2013) (“Most
states now permit freestanding claims of innocence, including those based on newly-discovered
evidence.”); 1 WILKES, supra note 252, at § 1:4, at 7–8 (indicating that thirty-seven states provide
relief under their principal post-conviction mechanism for newly discovered evidence of
innocence).
276. GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 275, at 164 (discussing DNA-access statutes); 1
WILKES, supra note 252, § 1:8, at 18 (indicating fifty states and the District of Columbia have
such statutes).
277. See GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 275, at 711 (“State limitations statutes have
become more forgiving in cases involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence, particularly
in comparison to their federal habeas corpus counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).”). But cf. id.
(characterizing state post-conviction review as generally cursory).
278. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1128, 1156 & n.132 (1986).
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their own remedies as supplemental to such federal claims as they may
be required to supply.279 But to the extent states might become required
to expend their efforts on federal-court-style habeas, their development
of independent standards could become diminished. As Professor Hills
observed in defense of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering cases,
“It is logical to infer that such erosion of the power, money, and prestige
of nonfederal offices can only reduce the incentive of voters and
politicians to expend time, energy, and money in voting, running for
office, monitoring representatives, and otherwise engaging in political
activities to control such offices.”280
The risks of displacement of independent state remedies would be
aggravated by the procedural and substantive complications of federal
habeas. Granted, the habeas proposal of Professors Vázquez & Vladeck
does not require habeas in state courts to conform in all respects to federal
court habeas.281 Indeed, their proposal seems in part motivated by a desire
to give an alternative to the increasingly byzantine doctrines of federal
habeas law,282 about which many have complained.283 But their reliance
on Testa to support their habeas proposals,284 and their assertion that

279. The current habeas statute gives state courts incentives to entertain claims that might be
raised later in federal court habeas, inter alia, because state court denial of a claim will generally
lead to federal court deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
280. See Hills, supra note 168, at 895. Hills was less opposed to judicial commandeering of
the Testa variety. See supra note 168.
281. Their proposal primarily addresses Teague-exception cases. See Vázquez & Vladeck,
supra note 4, at 916–26. They discuss some procedures relevant thereto and generally favor the
states’ following prisoner-helpful federal procedures, reasoning that those are constitutionally
required. See id. at 953 (arguing that the states can impose state statutes of limitations, but that in
a Teague-exceptions claim, “the Constitution requires that any state statute of limitations must,
like AEDPA’s, begin to run anew upon the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of the new rule”);
id. at 957–59 (arguing that state courts would need to be at least as generous as the Supreme Court
standards as to “cause” for failing to raise a particular claim in the original case and direct review).
282. See id. at 912 (noting AEDPA’s restrictions on habeas); cf. Seth Davis & Christopher
A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 411, 483 (2018) (arguing in
favor of states’ ability to entertain international human rights claims to help make up for federal
court narrowing of the Alien Tort Statute).
283. See LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 980–81 (“A number of commentators
have expressed the view that the current federal habeas corpus system, which is both extremely
complicated and highly unlikely to grant relief in any particular case, needs substantial reform.”);
id. (citing authority).
284. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (arguing that the Testa line of cases
“establishes that the state courts must entertain federal claims in the absence of a ‘valid excuse,’
and that a jurisdictional limitation is not a valid excuse if it discriminates against federal law or
otherwise reflects disagreement with the policy underlying the federal law” (quoting Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947))); id. at 929 (relying on obligations of state courts to adjudicate federal
claims).
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states cannot show hostility to federal law,285 could entail importing not
only what they would consider the attractive aspects of federal habeas
into state courts, but could entail importing federal limitations and other
complexities as well.286
Presumably, state courts—as a matter of state law—can mitigate some
of the finality and federalism-based limitations on habeas followed by the
federal courts.287 On the other hand, state courts that were forced to
conform to the federal-court version of habeas corpus might end up
imposing the same limitations. For example, while state courts arguably
would not be required to enforce procedural default rules with the same
rigor as do federal courts, they might be inclined to enforce the rigorous
procedural default rules if they were not keen on being required to
entertain all the same claims as the federal courts. In short, imposing
increased state-court conformity to federal-court habeas cannot be
expected to make up for the deficiencies of federal-court habeas.
Greater state court conformity to federal habeas could also lead to a
reduction in the federal courts’ role.288 In the midst of federal court

285. See, e.g., id. at 935 (“But a [state] jurisdictional rule would not be neutral if it reflects
hostility to a particular type of claim recognized by federal law.”).
286. See id. at 915, 944–59 (discussing some of the questions that could arise under their
proposal and suggesting that their analysis could have a significant impact on other aspects of
post-conviction review); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291–92 (2008) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the nonretroactivity of a federal constitutional decision under
Teague is a matter of federal law); Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, at 73–74, 89, 91 (seeing Article
I as the source of congressional power to require state courts to litigate affirmative federal claims,
and arguing that state courts should be required to follow federal procedures when they adjudicate
federal claims). But see Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal
Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 131–32 (1998) (arguing that the Redish and Sklaver proposal
fails to respect the status of state courts as separate judicial systems and would be burdensome);
id. at 134–35 (discussing benefits of procedural disuniformity).
Professor Meltzer recommended that federal common law as to when federal rights were
forfeited should apply in the state courts. See Meltzer, supra note 278, at 1194–95, 1202, 1208
(noting that the key implication of his view “is that this doctrine applies in any court that has
jurisdiction over a case in which a federal question is raised”). Professor Meltzer also noted the
difficulties of developing such federal common law and that his proposal “would increase the
complexity of determining whether a default should be excused.” Id. at 1225–26.
287. See, e.g., Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on
State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 424 (1993); Timothy P. O’Neill, New Law,
Old Cases, Fair Outcomes: Why the Illinois Supreme Court Must Overrule People v. Flowers, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727, 727–29 (2012) (arguing that the state courts should not follow Teague’s
retroactivity limitations on habeas).
288. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1317 and 2019 Supplement at 119
(discussing complications suggested by Montgomery’s intersection with Teague, and raising the
question of whether state court litigation of a Teague-exception claim would put the claim under
the review standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Section 2254(d) forbids the grant of habeas
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habeas expansion in the 1960s, Professor Daniel Meador suggested that
state courts broaden their post-conviction remedies to cover the same
ground as federal habeas.289 The aim was to reduce the role of the federal
court habeas while preserving fairness.290 More recently, Professors
Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King have suggested a more limited role for
federal habeas, contingent on states’ continuing to provide adequate
appellate and post-conviction process.291 If the Court were to follow
through on suggestions that state courts must provide federal-court-like
habeas actions, proposals to limit the federal courts’ own role would gain
strength.292 The argument would be that the states are now assuring
reasonable compliance with federal law and providing adequate
corrective processes themselves.293
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (2012).
289. Daniel J. Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and State Postconviction
Review, 50 A.B.A. J. 928, 929 (1964).
290. Id. at 931. Conversely, another commentator suggested that the state courts reduce their
post-conviction review to ease the way to a single federal determination. See Comment, supra
note 256, at 1095.
291. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 798, 820 836–37, 846 (2009). Hoffmann and King
recommend greater federal funding for criminal defense and that federal habeas should focus on
claims of innocence, claims as to retroactively applicable new rules, and death sentences. Id. at
795, 797–98; see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 94–99, 106 (2011) (indicating that they would use actual innocence as opening up
constitutional claims and for a freestanding actual innocence claim if the Court recognized a bare
innocence claim as stating a constitutional violation); cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at
938–39 (suggesting that the Constitution would not require the federal courts to entertain Teagueexception claims if state courts must hear them, but reading the federal habeas statute to give
federal courts jurisdiction of such claims).
292. It may be unlikely that state courts would be required on habeas to determine whether
another state judge or court had previously unreasonably interpreted federal law. Generally,
claims determined by a state court in the original proceeding or on appeal are treated as exhausted.
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1350–51.
293. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 494–95 (1963) (favoring an adequate corrective process view
of habeas); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–88 (1991) (stating principles that
constitutional remedies serve the function of individual redress and also ensuring that the
government generally respects constitutional norms); id. at 1813–15 (discussing different habeas
theories, including one that assimilates federal habeas to an individual right to appeal and another
that involves assuring a fair enough process of adjudication); Hoffmann & King, supra note 291,
at 810 (arguing that habeas’s role in case-by-case error correction is ineffectual and
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Haywood’s requirement of state court conformity with § 1983 could
similarly suppress state law variety and experimentation.294 As is true of
federal habeas, there is a good bit of dissatisfaction with § 1983
doctrine.295 Commentators argue for greater entity liability and for a
reduced role for qualified immunity for individual officers.296 Some have
suggested that a better regime might entail trading off lesser potential
damages for greater certainty of obtaining a liability determination.297
Indeed, the state of New York tried to substitute state liability for
individual officer liability by the statute at issue in Haywood. By telling
the state courts they must in all events entertain § 1983 suits in their own
general-jurisdiction courts, the Supreme Court may well lead state actors
to conclude that remedial experimentation can do little to accomplish
such trade-offs, but rather will primarily augment plaintiff options.298
Tax remedies—where state courts have not had to conform to federal
causes of action— provide an example of where allowing states to follow
their own lights in providing remedies can result in arguably desirable
remedial trade-offs. When federal courts entertained state tax claims, they
strictly required coercive collection or payments under protest, and also
required actions to be at least nominally pursued against individual state
officers.299 State courts in tax cases often have lessened procedural
prerequisites and allowed relief directly against the state. Thus, the states
generated remedies that are different, although not necessarily overall
worse, than those that would have resulted from a requirement that states
must imitate federal causes of action.
Therefore, while scholars currently argue that forcing state courts to
take on unwanted jurisdiction will enhance rights enforcement,300 such a
recommending a more limited role for federal habeas); cf. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 210
(“[T]he issue in federal court has always been viewed as the validity of the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, not the failure of the state to provide post-conviction process. If the latter
were itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it alone would justify a discharge without
the necessity of examining the underlying constitutional claim.” (footnote omitted)).
294. State courts have generally entertained § 1983 cases. See 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 2:39 (2018).
295. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, PAMELA S. KARLAN, PETER W. LOW & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN,
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 148–49 (4th ed. 2018) (citing authority).
296. See generally, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 45 (2018) (arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity lacks legal justification).
297. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 204.
298. Even absent Haywood, however, the plaintiff could have chosen a federal court § 1983
action in lieu of the state court of claims action.
299. See Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 136–37. Good faith immunities, however, were
not a feature of federal tax cases, even when brought against individual officers. See id. at 150.
300. See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1146–47, 1151–52 (arguing that forcing
the state courts to hear federal claims will lead them to hear related state claims and will also help
assure that the court system is available to hear federal claims); Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3,
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result is less than clear. Enforced uniformity could discourage states from
providing different answers to the problems of state government
illegality. And it may, particularly with respect to habeas corpus, end up
decreasing the role of the federal courts in the very name of bringing the
state courts into conformity with federal courts.
CONCLUSION
There is little early support for requiring state courts to entertain
affirmative federal statutory and constitutional claims. In the twentieth
century, however, the Court began to compel state courts to take
jurisdiction of certain federal statutory actions in the Testa line of cases.
Such compulsion was not justified by the Supremacy Clause or related
arguments. The Court also occasionally required state courts to provide
certain constitutionally necessary affirmative remedies in the Crain line
of cases. These cases tended to involve refunds for illegal taxes, where
the necessity for a remedy was clear and rule-like, and where lower
federal court jurisdiction was unavailable or disfavored. The
constitutionally compelled remedies strand was based in the requirement
of adequate remedies for certain constitutional violations rather than in a
Supremacy-based command that the states must provide the same causes
of action that the federal courts provided.
The effect of Haywood v. Drown and scholarly proposals following
Montgomery v. Louisiana could submerge the Crain strand into the Testa
line, possibly bringing state courts into greater conformity with federal
courts as to causes of action for raising constitutional claims. But if the
complexity and difficulty of obtaining federal court remedies under
§ 1983 and federal habeas are the problem, requiring greater state court
conformity is not the obvious solution. As Professor Henry Hart said,
“Common sense and the instinct for freedom alike can be counted upon
to tell the American people never to put all their eggs of hope from
governmental problem-solving in one governmental basket.”301

at 93 (forcing states to entertain federal cases will help to assure that plaintiffs can efficiently
enforce their rights).
301. Hart, supra note 31, at 540.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

53

